and even cheerful.  If he had had a well-equipped army of a hundred thousand veterans at his back, he could not have appeared more composed and confident.  On shaking hands with us, he simply expressed his satisfaction with the result of our operations at Harper’s Ferry, and with our timely arrival at Sharpsburg; adding that with our reinforcements he felt confident of being able to hold his ground until the arrival of the divisions of R.H.  Anderson, McLaws, and A.P.  Hill, which were still behind, and which did not arrive till next day."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 675.)

Yet the reinforcements which Jackson and Walker had brought up were no considerable addition to Lee’s strength.  Jones’ division consisted of no more than 1600 muskets, Lawton’s of less than 3500.  Including officers and artillery, therefore, the effectives of these divisions numbered about 5500.  A.P.  Hill’s division appears to have mustered 5000 officers and men, and we may add 1000 for men sick or on detached duties.  The total should undoubtedly have been larger.  After the battle of Cedar Run, Jackson had 22,450 effectives in his ranks.  His losses in the operations against Pope, and the transfer of Robertson’s cavalry to Stuart, had brought his numbers down by 5787; but on September 16, including 70 killed or wounded at Harper’s Ferry, they should have been not less than 16,800.  In reality they were only 11,500.  We have not far to look for the cause of this reduction.  Many of the men had absented themselves before the army crossed into Maryland; and if those who remained with the colours had seen little fighting since Pope’s defeat, they had had no reason to complain of inactivity.  The operations which resulted in the capture of Harper’s Ferry had been arduous in the extreme.  Men who had taken part in the forced marches of the Valley campaign declared that the march from Frederick to Harper’s Ferry surpassed all their former experiences.  In three-and-a-half days they had covered over sixty miles, crossing two mountain ranges, and fording the Potomac.  The weather had been intensely hot, and the dust was terrible.  Nor had the investment of Harper’s Ferry been a period of repose.  They had been under arms during the night which preceded the surrender, awaiting the signal to assault within a few hundred yards of the enemy’s sentries.  As soon as the terms of capitulation were arranged they had been hurried back to the bivouac, had cooked two days’ rations, and shortly after midnight had marched to the Potomac, seventeen miles away.  This night march, coming on the top of their previous exertions, had taxed the strength of many beyond endurance.  The majority were badly shod.  Many were not shod at all.  They were ill-fed, and men ill-fed are on the highroad to hospital.  There were stragglers, then, from every company in the command.  Even the Stonewall Brigade, though it had still preserved its five regiments, was reduced to 300 muskets; and the other brigades of Jackson’s division were but little stronger.  Walker’s division, too, although less hardly used in the campaign than the Valley troops, had diminished under the strain of the night march, and mustered no more than 3500 officers and men at Sharpsburg.  Thus the masses of troops which McClellan conceived were hidden in rear of D.H.  Hill and Longstreet amounted in reality to some 10,000 effective soldiers.