“Through God’s blessing,” he reported to Lee at eight o’clock, “Harper’s Ferry and its garrison are to be surrendered.  As Hill’s troops have borne the heaviest part of the engagement, he will be left in command until the prisoners and public property shall be disposed of, unless you direct otherwise.  The other forces can move off this evening so soon as they get their rations.  To what point shall they move?  I write at this time in order that you may be apprised of the condition of things.  You may expect to hear from me again to-day, after I get more information respecting the number of prisoners, etc."* (* O.R. volume 19 part 1 page 951.  General Longstreet (From Manassas to Appomattox page 233) suggests that Jackson, after the capitulation of Harper’s Ferry, should have moved east of South Mountain against McClellan’s rear.  Jackson, however, was acquainted neither with McClellan’s position nor with Lee’s intentions, and nothing could have justified such a movement except the direct order of the Commander-in-Chief.)

Lee, with D.H.  Hill, Longstreet, and Stuart, was already falling back from the South Mountain to Sharpsburg, a little village on the right bank of the Antietam Creek; and late in the afternoon Jackson, Walker, and McLaws were ordered to rejoin without delay.* (* The Invasion of Maryland, General Longstreet, Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 666.) September 14 had been an anxious day for the Confederate Commander-in-Chief.  During the morning D.H.  Hill, with no more than 5000 men in his command, had seen the greater part of McClellan’s army deploy for action in the wide valley below and to the eastward of Turner’s Gap.  Stuart held the woods below Crampton’s Gap, six miles south, with Robertson’s brigade, now commanded by the gallant Munford; and on the heights above McLaws had posted three brigades, for against this important pass, the shortest route by which the Federals could interpose between Lee and Jackson, McClellan’s left wing, consisting of 20,000 men under General Franklin, was steadily advancing.

The positions at both Turner’s and Crampton’s Gaps were very strong.  The passes, at their highest points, are at least 600 feet above the valley, and the slopes steep, rugged, and thickly wooded.  The enemy’s artillery had little chance.  Stone walls, running parallel to the crest, gave much protection to the Southern infantry, and loose boulders and rocky scarps increased the difficulties of the ascent.  But the numbers available for defence were very small; and had McClellan marched during the night he would probably have been master of the passes before midday.  As it was, Crampton’s Gap was not attacked by Franklin until noon; and although at the same hour the advanced guard of the Federal right wing had gained much ground, it was not till four in the evening that a general attack was made on Turner’s Gap.  By this time Longstreet, after a march of thirteen miles, had reached the battle-field;*