to look for us, and we should guard against being caught in such a condition.  Our army consisted of a superior quality of soldiers, but it was in no condition to divide in the enemy’s country.  I urged that we should keep it in hand, recruit our strength, and get up supplies, and then we could do anything we pleased.  General Lee made no reply to this, and I supposed the Harper’s Ferry scheme was abandoned."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 662.)

Jackson, too, would have preferred to fight McClellan first, and consider the question of communicating afterwards;* (* Dabney volume 2 page 302.) but he accepted with alacrity the duty which his colleague had declined.  His own divisions, reinforced by those of McLaws, R. H. Anderson,* (* Anderson was placed under McLaws’ command.) and Walker, were detailed for the expedition; Harper’s Ferry was to be invested on three sides, and the march was to begin at daybreak on September 10.  Meanwhile, the remainder of the army was to move north-west to Hagerstown, five-and-twenty miles from Frederick, where it would alarm Lincoln for the safety of Pennsylvania, and be protected from McClellan by the parallel ranges of the Catoctin and South Mountains.

Undoubtedly, in ordinary circumstances, General Longstreet would have been fully justified in protesting against the dispersion of the army in the presence of the enemy.  Hagerstown and Harper’s Ferry are five-and-twenty miles apart, and the Potomac was between them.  McClellan’s advanced guard, on the other hand, was thirty miles from Harper’s Ferry, and forty-five from Hagerstown.  The Federals were advancing, slowly and cautiously it is true, but still pushing westward, and it was certainly possible, should they receive early intelligence of the Confederate movements, that before Harper’s Ferry fell a rapid march might enable them to interpose between Lee and Jackson.  But both Lee and Jackson calculated the chances with a surer grasp of the several factors.  Had the general in command of the Federal army been bold and enterprising, had the Federal cavalry been more efficient, or Stuart less skilful, they would certainly have hesitated before running the risk of defeat in detail.  But so long as McClellan controlled the movements of the enemy, rapid and decisive action was not to be apprehended; and it was exceedingly improbable that the scanty and unreliable information which he might obtain from civilian sources would induce him to throw off his customary caution.  Moreover, only a fortnight previously the Federal army had been heavily defeated.* (* “Are you acquainted with McClellan?” said Lee to General Walker on September 8, 1862.  “He is an able general but a very cautious one.  His enemies among his own people think him too much so.  His army is in a very demoralised and chaotic condition, and will not be prepared for offensive operations—­or he will not think it so—­for three or four weeks.”—­Battles and Leaders volume 2 pages 605 and 606.)