than the defence of the Potomac or the secession of Maryland, and now that Richmond had been relieved, the whole energy of the Government was expended on the operations in Kentucky and Tennessee.  It may well be questioned whether a vigorous endeavour, supported by all the means available, and even by troops drawn from the West, to defeat the Army of the Potomac and to capture Washington, would not have been a more efficacious means to the same end; but Davis and his Cabinet consistently preferred dispersion to concentration, and, indeed, the situation of the South was such as might well have disturbed the strongest brains.  The sea-power of the Union was telling with deadly effect.  Although the most important strategic points on the Mississippi were still held by Confederate garrisons, nearly every mile of the great river, from Cairo to New Orleans, was patrolled by the Federal gunboats; and in deep water, from the ports of the Atlantic to the roadsteads of the Gulf, the frigates maintained their vigilant blockade.

Even on the northern border there was hardly a gleam of light across the sky.  The Federal forces were still formidable in numbers, and a portion of the Army of the Potomac had not been involved in Pope’s defeat.  It was possible, therefore, that more skilful generalship than had yet been displayed by the Northern commanders might deprive the Confederates of all chance of winning a decisive victory.  Yet, although the opportunity of meeting the enemy with a prospect of success might never offer, an inroad into Northern territory promised good results.

1.  Maryland, still strong in sympathy with the South, might be induced by the presence of a Southern army to rise against the Union.

2.  The Federal army would be drawn off westward from its present position; and so long as it was detained on the northern frontier of Virginia nothing could be attempted against Richmond, while time would be secured for improving the defences of the Confederate capital.

3.  The Shenandoah Valley would be most effectively protected, and its produce transported without risk of interruption both to Lee’s army and to Richmond.

To obtain such advantages as these was worth an effort, and Lee, after careful consideration, determined to cross the Potomac.  The movement was made with the same speed which had characterised the operations against Pope.  It was of the utmost importance that the passage of the river should be accomplished before the enemy had time to discover the design and to bar the way.  Stuart’s cavalry formed the screen.  On the morning after the battle of Chantilly, Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade followed the retreating Federals in the direction of Alexandria.  Hampton’s brigade was pushed forward to Dranesville by way of Hunter’s Mill.  Robertson’s brigade made a strong demonstration towards Washington, and Munford, with the 2nd Virginia, cleared out a Federal detachment which occupied Leesburg.  Behind the cavalry the army marched unmolested and unobserved.1