first help me to drive these people away from Richmond.”  This object had been now thoroughly accomplished, and General Lee’s decision to redeem his promise was by none more heartily approved than by the leader of the Valley army.  And yet, though the risks of the venture were small, the prospects of complete success were dubious.  The opportunity had come, but the means of seizing it were feeble.  Lee himself was buoyed up by no certain expectation of great results.  In advocating invasion he confessed to the President that his troops were hardly fit for service beyond the frontier.  “The army,” he wrote, “is not properly equipped for an invasion of the enemy’s territory.  It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes.  And in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes...What concerns me most is the fear of getting out of ammunition."* (* O.R. volume 19 part 2 pages 590, 591.)

This description was by no means over-coloured.  As a record of military activity the campaign of the spring and summer of 1862 has few parallels.  Jackson’s division, since the evacuation of Winchester at the end of February, that is, in six months, had taken part in no less than eight battles and innumerable minor engagements; it had marched nearly a thousand miles, and it had long ago discarded tents.  The remainder of the army had been hardly less severely tasked.  The demands of the outpost service in front of Richmond had been almost as trying as the forced marches in the Valley, and the climate of the Peninsula had told heavily on the troops.  From the very first the army had been indifferently equipped; the ill effects of hasty organisation were still glaring; the regimental officers had not yet learned to study the wants and comfort of their men; the troops were harassed by the ignorance of a staff that was still half-trained, and the commissariat officials were not abreast of their important duties.  More than all, the operations against Pope, just brought to a successful issue, had been most arduous; and the strain on the endurance of the troops, not yet recovered from their exertions in the Peninsula, had been so great that a period of repose seemed absolutely necessary.  It was not only that battle and sickness had thinned the ranks, but that those whose health had been proof against continued hardships, and whose strength and spirit were still equal to further efforts, were so badly shod that a few long marches over indifferent roads were certain to be more productive of casualties than a pitched battle.  The want of boots had already been severely felt.* (* “1000 pairs of shoes were obtained in Fredericktown, 250 pairs in Williamsport, and about 400 pairs in this city (Hagerstown).  They will not be sufficient to cover the bare feet of the army.”  Lee to Davis, September 12, 1862.  O.R. volume 19 part 2 page 605.) It has been said that the route of the Confederate army from