its own country, unless the capital is occupied and the hideous sufferings of war are brought directly home to the mass of the population.  A single victory on Northern soil, within easy reach of Washington, was far more likely to bring about the independence of the South than even a succession of victories in Virginia.  It was time, then, for a strategic counterstroke on a larger scale than had hitherto been attempted.  The opportunity was ripe.  No great risk would be incurred by crossing the Potomac.  There was no question of meeting a more powerful enemy.  “The Federals, recruited by fresh levies; would undoubtedly be numerically the stronger; and the Confederate equipment, despite the large captures of guns and rifles, was still deficient.  But for deficiencies in numbers and in materiel the higher morale and the more skilful leading would make ample compensation.  It might safely be inferred that the Northern soldiers would no longer display the cool confidence of Gaines’ Mill or even of Malvern Hill.  The places of the brave and seasoned soldiers who had fallen would be filled by recruits; and generals who had been out-manoeuvred on so many battle-fields might fairly be expected, when confronted once more with their dreaded opponents, to commit even more egregious errors than those into which they had already fallen.

September 2.

Such were the ideas entertained by Lee and accepted by the President, and on the morning of September 2, as soon as it was found that the Federals had sought shelter under the forts of Alexandria, Jackson was instructed to cross the Potomac, and form the advanced guard of the army of invasion.  It may be imagined with what feelings he issued his orders for the march on Leesburg, above which lay an easy ford.  For more than twelve months, since the very morrow of Bull Run, he had persistently advocated an aggressive policy.* (* In Mrs. Jackson’s Memoirs of her husband a letter is quoted from her brother-in-law, giving the substance of a conversation with General Jackson on the conduct of the war.  This letter I have not felt justified in quoting.  In the first place, it lacks corroboration; in the second place, it contains a very incomplete statement of a large strategical question; in the third place, the opinions put in Jackson’s mouth are not only contradictory, but altogether at variance with his practice; and lastly, it attributes certain ideas to the general—­raising “the black flag.” etc.—­which his confidential aid officers declare that he never for a moment entertained.) The fierce battles round Richmond and Manassas he had looked upon as merely the prelude to more resolute efforts.  After he had defeated Banks at Winchester he had urged his friend Colonel Boteler to inform the authorities that, if they would reinforce him, he would undertake to capture Washington.  The message had been conveyed to Lee.  “Tell General Jackson,” was the reply of the Commander-in-Chief, “that he must