should devolve upon her troops than shooting down their foes as they moved across the open to the assault of strong intrenchments, then the hope might reasonably be entertained that she might tire out the North.  But the campaign, so far as it had progressed, had shown, if indeed history had not already made it sufficiently clear, that opportunities for such tactics were not likely to occur.  The Federal generals had consistently refused to run their heads against earthworks.  Their overwhelming numbers would enable them to turn any position, however formidable; and the only chance of success lay in keeping these numbers apart and in preventing them from combining.

It was by strategic and tactical counterstrokes that the recent victories had been won.  Although it had awaited attack within its own frontier, the Army of Northern Virginia had but small experience of defensive warfare.  With the exception of the actions round Yorktown, of Cross Keys, and of the Second Manassas, the battles had been entirely aggressive.  The idea that a small army, opposed to one vastly superior, cannot afford to attack because the attack is costly, and that it must trust for success to favourable ground, had been effectually dispelled.  Lee and Jackson had taught the Southerners that the secret of success lies not in strong positions, but in the concentration, by means of skilful strategy, of superior numbers on the field of battle.  Their tactics had been essentially offensive, and it is noteworthy that their victories had not been dearly purchased.  If we compare them with those of the British in the Peninsula, we shall find that with no greater loss than Wellington incurred in the defensive engagements of three years, 1810, 1811, 1812, the Confederates had attacked and routed armies far larger in proportion than those which Wellington had merely repulsed.* (* Wellington’s losses in the battles of these three years were 33,000.  The Confederates lost 23,000 in the Valley and the Seven Days and 10,000 in the campaign against Pope.  It is not to be understood, however, that the Duke’s strategy was less skilful or less audacious than Lee’s and Jackson’s.  During these three years his army, largely composed of Portuguese and Spaniards, was incapable of offensive tactics against his veteran enemies, and he was biding his time.  It was the inefficiency of his allies and the miserable support he received from the English Government that prevented him, until 1813, from adopting a bolder policy.)

But if they had shown that the best defence lies in a vigorous offensive, their offensive had not yet been applied at the decisive point.  To make victory complete it is the sounder policy to carry the war into hostile territory.  A nation endures with comparative equanimity defeat beyond its own borders.  Pride and prestige may suffer, but a high-spirited people will seldom be brought to the point of making terms unless its army is annihilated in the heart of