Lee’s strategic manoeuvres were undoubtedly hazardous.  But that an antagonist of different calibre would have met them with condign punishment is short-sighted criticism.  Against an antagonist of different calibre, against such generals as he was afterwards to encounter, they would never have been attempted.  “He studied his adversary,” says his Military Secretary, “knew his peculiarities, and adapted himself to them.  His own methods no one could foresee-he varied them with every change in the commanders opposed to him.  He had one method with McClellan, another with Pope, another with Hooker, another with Meade, and yet another with Grant.”  Nor was the dangerous period of the Manassas campaign so protracted as might be thought.  Jackson marched north from Jefferson on August 25.  On the 26th he reached Bristoe Station.  Pope, during these two days, might have thrown himself either on Longstreet or on Jackson.  He did neither, and on the morning of the 27th, when Jackson reached Sudley Springs, the crisis had passed.  Had the Federals blocked Thoroughfare Gap that day, and prevented Longstreet’s passage, Lee was still able to concentrate without incurring defeat.  Jackson, retreating by Aldie Gap, would have joined Longstreet west of the mountains; Pope would have escaped defeat, but the Confederates would have lost nothing.

Moreover, it is well to remember that the Confederate cavalry was in every single respect, in leading, horsemanship, training, and knowledge of the country, superior to the Federal.  The whole population, too, was staunchly Southern.  It was always probable, therefore, that information would be scarce in the Federal camps, and that if some items did get through the cavalry screen, they would be so late in reaching Pope’s headquarters as to be practically useless.  There can be no question that Lee, in these operations, relied much on the skill of Stuart.  Stuart was given a free hand.  Unlike Pope, Lee issued few orders as to the disposition of his horsemen.  He merely explained the manoeuvres he was about to undertake, pointed out where he wished the main body of the cavalry should be found, and left all else to their commander.  He had no need to tell Stuart that he required information of the enemy, or to lay down the method by which it was to be obtained.  That was Stuart’s normal duty, and right well was it performed.  How admirably the young cavalry general co-operated with Jackson has already been described.  The latter suggested, the former executed, and the combination of the three arms, during the whole of Jackson’s operations against Pope, was as close as when Ashby led his squadrons in the Valley.