September 2.

The action at Chantilly, however, induced a more prudent mood; and, on the morning of the 2nd, he reported that “there was an intense idea among the troops that they must get behind the intrenchments [of Alexandria]; that there was an undoubted purpose, on the part of the enemy, to keep on slowly turning his position so as to come in on the right, and that the forces under his command were unable to prevent him doing so in the open field.  Halleck must decide what was to be done.”  The reply was prompt, Pope was to bring his forces, “as best he could,” under the shelter of the heavy guns.

Whatever might be the truth as regards the troops, there could be no question but that the general was demoralised; and, preceded by thousands of stragglers, the army fell back without further delay to the Potomac.  It was not followed except by Stuart.  “It was found,” says Lee, in his official dispatch, “that the enemy had conducted his retreat so rapidly that the attempt to interfere with him was abandoned.  The proximity of the fortifications around Alexandria and Washington rendered further pursuit useless.”

On the same day General McClellan was entrusted with the defence of Washington, and Pope, permitted to resign, was soon afterwards relegated to an obscure command against the Indians of the North-west.  His errors had been flagrant.  He can hardly be charged with want of energy, but his energy was spasmodic; on the field of battle he was strangely indolent, and yet he distrusted the reports of others.  But more fatal than his neglect of personal reconnaissance was his power of self-deception.  He was absolutely incapable of putting himself in his enemy’s place, and time after time he acted on the supposition that Lee and Jackson would do exactly what he most wished them to do.  When his supplies were destroyed, he concentrated at Manassas Junction, convinced that Jackson would remain to be overwhelmed.  When he found Jackson near Sudley Springs, and Thoroughfare Gap open, he rushed forward to attack him, convinced that Longstreet could not be up for eight-and-forty hours.  When he sought shelter at Centreville, he told Halleck not to be uneasy, convinced that Lee would knock his head against his fortified position.  Before the engagement at Chantilly he had made up his mind to attack the enemy the next morning.  A few hours later he reported that his troops were utterly untrustworthy, although 20,000 of them, under Franklin and Sumner, had not yet seen the enemy.  In other respects his want of prudence had thwarted his best endeavours.  His cavalry at the beginning of the campaign was effectively employed.  But so extravagant were his demands on the mounted arm, that before the battle of Manassas half his regiments were dismounted.  It is true that the troopers were still indifferent horsemen and bad horse-masters, but it was the fault of the commander that the unfortunate animals had no rest, that brigades were sent to do the work of