Pope’s actions, however, were invariably at variance with Pope’s words.  At 6 P.M. he had ordered Franklin, who was approaching Bull Run from Alexandria with 10,000 fresh troops, to occupy with his own command and whatever other troops he could collect, the fortifications round Centreville, and hold them “to the last extremity.”  Banks, still at Bristoe Station, was told to destroy all the supplies of which he was in charge, as well as the railway, and to march on Centreville; while 30 guns and more than 2000 wounded were left upon the field.  Nor were Pope’s anticipations as to the future to be fulfilled.  The position at Centrevile was strong.  The intrenchments constructed by the Confederates during the winter of 1861 were still standing.  Halleck had forwarded supplies; there was ammunition in abundance, and 20,000 infantry under Franklin and Sumner—­for the latter also had come up from Washington—­more than compensated for the casualties of the battle.  But formidable earthworks, against generals who dare manoeuvre, are often a mere trap for the unwary.

August 31.

Before daylight Stuart and his troopers were in the saddle; and, picking up many stragglers as they marched, came within range of the guns at Centreville.  Lee, accompanied by Jackson, having reconnoitred the position, determined to move once more upon the Federal rear.  Longstreet remained on the battle-field to engage the attention of the enemy and cover the removal of the wounded; while Jackson, crossing not by the Stone Bridge, but by Sudley Ford, was entrusted with the work of forcing Pope from his strong position.

The weather was inclement, the roads were quagmires, and the men were in no condition to make forced marches.  Yet before nightfall Jackson had pushed ten miles through the mud, halting near Pleasant Valley, on the Little River turnpike, five miles north-west of Centreville.  During the afternoon Longstreet, throwing a brigade across Bull Run to keep the enemy on the qui vive, followed the same route.  Of these movements Pope received no warning, and Jackson’s proclivity for flank manoeuvres had evidently made no impression on him, for, in blissful unconsciousness that his line of retreat was already threatened, he ordered all waggons to be unloaded at Centreville, and to return to Fairfax Station for forage and rations.

September 1.

But on the morning of September 1, although his whole army, including Banks, was closely concentrated behind strong intrenchments, Pope had conceived a suspicion that he would find it difficult to fulfil his promise to Halleck that “he would hold on.”  The previous night Stuart had been active towards his right and rear, capturing his reconnoitring parties, and shelling his trains.  Before noon suspicion became certainty.  Either stragglers or the country people reported that Jackson was moving down the Little River turnpike, and Centreville was at once evacuated, the troops marching to a new position round Fairfax Court House.