Once more the fresh reserve, thrown in at the propitious moment, swept back numbers far superior to itself.  Once more order prevailed over disorder, and the cold steel asserted its supremacy.  The strength of the assailants was already spent.  The wave receded more swiftly than it had risen, and through the copses and across the railroad the Confederates drove their exhausted foe.  General Hill had instructed Early that he was not to pass beyond the original front; but it was impossible to restrain the troops, and not till they had advanced several hundred yards was the brigade halted and brought back.

5.15 P.M.

The counterstroke was as completely successful as those that had preceded it.  Early’s losses were comparatively slight, those inflicted on the enemy very heavy, and Hill’s brigades were finally relieved.  Pope abandoned all further efforts to crush Jackson.  Five assaults had failed. 30,000 infantry had charged in vain through the fatal wood; and of the 8000 Federal casualties reported on this day, by far the larger proportion was due to the deadly fire and dashing counterstrokes of Jackson’s infantry.

While Pope was hurling division after division against the Confederate left, Lee, with Longstreet at his side, observed the conflict from Stuart’s Hill, the wooded eminence which stands south-west of Groveton.  On this wing, though a mile distant from Jackson’s battle, both Federals and Confederates were in force.  At least one half of Pope’s army had gradually assembled on this flank.  Here were Reynolds and McDowell, and on the Manassas road stood two divisions under Porter.

Within the woods on Stuart’s Hill, with the cavalry on his flank, Longstreet had deployed his whole force, with the exception of Anderson, who had not yet passed Thoroughfare Gap.  But although both Pope and Lee were anxious to engage, neither could bring their subordinates to the point.  Pope had sent vague instructions to Porter and McDowell, and when at Length he had substituted a definite order it was not only late in arriving, but the generals found that it was based on an absolutely incorrect view of the situation.  The Federal commander had no knowledge that Longstreet, with 25,000 men, was already in position beyond his left.  So close lay the Confederates that under the impression that Stuart’s Hill was still untenanted, he desired Porter to move across it and envelop Jackson’s right.  Porter, suspecting that the main body of the Southern army was before him, declined to risk his 10,000 men until he had reported the true state of affairs.  A peremptory reply to attack at once was received at 6.30, but it was then too late to intervene.