The situation, however, was no clearer to the Confederates.  The enemy had disappeared in the great woods south-west of Groveton, and heavy columns were still reported coming up from Gainesville.  During the afternoon, however, the cavalry captured a Federal courier, carrying McDowell’s orders for the movement of the left and centre, which had been placed under his command, to Manassas Junction,* and this important document was immediately forwarded to Jackson.

(* The order, dated 2 A.M., August 25, was to the following effect:—­

1.  Sigel’s Corps to march from Gainesville to Manassas Junction, the right resting on the Manassas railroad.

2.  Reynolds to follow Sigel.

3.  King to follow Reynolds.

4.  Ricketts to follow King; but to halt at Thoroughfare Gap if the enemy threatened the pass.

King was afterwards, while on the march, directed to Centreville by the Warrenton-Alexandria road.)

“Johnson’s messenger,” says General Taliaferro, “found the Confederate headquarters established on the shady side of an old-fashioned worm-fence, in the corner of which General Jackson and his division commanders were profoundly sleeping after the fatigues of the preceding night, notwithstanding the intense heat of the August day.  There was not so much as an ambulance at headquarters.  The headquarters’ train was back beyond the Rappahannock, at Jefferson, with remounts, camp equipage, and all the arrangements for cooking and serving food.  All the property of the general, the staff, and the headquarters’ bureau was strapped to the pommels and cantels of the saddles, and these formed the pillows of their weary owners.  The captured dispatch roused Jackson like an electric shock.  He was essentially a man of action.  He rarely, if ever, hesitated.  He never asked advice.  He called no council to discuss the situation disclosed by this communication, although his ranking officers were almost at his side.  He asked no conference of opinion.  He made no suggestion, but simply, without a word, except to repeat the language of the message, turned to me and said:  “Move your division and attack the enemy;” and to Ewell, “‘Support the attack.’” The slumbering soldiers sprang from the earth at the first murmur.  They were sleeping almost in ranks; and by the time the horses of their officers were saddled, the long lines of infantry were moving to the anticipated battle-field.

“The two divisions, after marching some distance to the north of the turnpike, were halted and rested, and the prospect of an engagement on that afternoon seemed to disappear with the lengthening shadows.  The enemy did not come.  The Warrenton turnpike, along which it was supposed he would march, was in view, but it was as free from Federal soldiery as it had been two days before, when Jackson’s men had streamed along its highway."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 pages 507 and 508.)

(Map of the situation at sunset, August 28th, 1862.)