Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,209 pages of information about Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War.

Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,209 pages of information about Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War.
through Thoroughfare Gap; but, although the compilers of the Records have placed it under the date August 26, it seems evident, as this officer (see page 670) was at Rappahannock Station on the 26th and 27th (O.R. volume 12 part. 3 page 688), that the report refers to Longstreet’s and not Jackson’s troops, and was written on August 28.) Nevertheless, although working in the dark, the Federal commander, up to the moment he reached Bristoe Station, had acted with sound judgment.  He had inferred from the reports of his signalmen that Jackson was marching to Front Royal on the Shenandoah; but in order to clear up the situation, on the 26th Sigel and McDowell were ordered to force the passage of the Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge and the Sulphur Springs, and obtain information of the enemy’s movements.  Reno, at the same time, was to cross below the railway bridge and make for Culpeper.  The manoeuvres, however, were not carried out as contemplated.  Only McDowell advanced; and as Lee had replaced Longstreet, who marched to Orleans the same afternoon, by Anderson, but little was discovered.

(Map of the situation at sunset, August 27th, 1862.)

It was evident, however, that the Confederates were trending steadily northwards, and on the night of the 26th Pope ordered his 80,000 Federals to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Warrenton.  Reports had come in that hostile troops had passed through Salem, White Plains, and Thoroughfare Gap.* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 672.  Pope to Porter page 675.  Pope to Halleck page 684.) But it seemed improbable, both to Pope and McDowell, the second in command, that more was meant by this than a flank attack on Warrenton.  McDowell expressed his opinion that a movement round the right wing in the direction of Alexandria was far too hazardous for the enemy to attempt.  Pope appears to have acquiesced, and a line of battle near Warrenton, with a strong reserve at Greenwich, to the right rear, was then decided on.  Franklin’s army corps from the Peninsula, instead of proceeding to Aquia Creek, was disembarking at Alexandria, and Halleck had been requested to push these 10,000 men forward with all speed to Gainesville.  The Kanawha regiments had also reached Washington, and Pope was under the impression that these too would be sent to join him.  He had therefore but little apprehension for his rear.  The one error of judgment into which both Pope and McDowell had been betrayed was in not giving Lee due credit for audacity or Jackson for energy.  That Lee would dare to divide his army they had never conceived; that Jackson would march fifty miles in two days and place his single corps astride their communications was an idea which had they thought of they would have instantly dismissed.  Like the Austrian generals when they first confronted Napoleon, they might well have complained that their enemy broke every rule of the military art; and like all generals who believe that war is a mere matter of precedent, they found themselves egregiously deceived.

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Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.