of the enemy, a trooper of the Black Horse, a regiment of young planters which now formed Jackson’s Escort, disguised as a countryman, made his way back from headquarters, and Jackson learned that Longstreet, who had started the previous evening, was following his own track by Orleans, Salem, and Thoroughfare Gap.* (* “Up to the night of August 28 we received,” says Longstreet, “reports from General Jackson at regular intervals, assuring us of his successful operation, and of confidence in his ability to baffle all efforts of the enemy, till we should reach him.”  Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 517.) It was evident, then, that the whole Federal army was in motion northwards, and that Longstreet had crossed the Rappahannock.  But Longstreet had many miles to march and Thoroughfare Gap to pass before he could lend assistance; and the movement of the enemy on Gainesville threatened to intervene between the widely separated wings of the Confederate army.

It was no difficult matter for Jackson to decide on the course to be adopted.  There was but one thing to do, to retreat at once; and only one line of escape still open, the roads leading north and north-west from Manassas Junction.  To remain at Manassas and await Lee’s arrival would have been to sacrifice his command. 20,000 men, even with the protection of intrenchments, could hardly hope to hold the whole Federal army at bay for two days; and it was always possible that Pope, blocking Thoroughfare Gap with a portion of his force, might delay Lee for even longer than two days.  Nor did it recommend itself to Jackson as sound strategy to move south, attack the Federal column approaching Bristoe, and driving it from his path to escape past the rear of the column moving to Gainesville.  The exact position of the Federal troops was far from clear.  Large forces might be encountered near the Rappahannock, and part of McClellan’s army was known to be marching westward from Aquia Creek.  Moreover, such a movement would have accentuated the separation of the Confederate wings, and a local success over a portion of the hostile army would have been but a poor substitute for the decisive victory which Lee hoped to win when his whole force was once more concentrated.

About three in the afternoon the thunder of artillery was heard from the direction of Bristoe.  Ewell had sent a brigade along the railroad to support some cavalry on reconnaissance, and to destroy a bridge over Kettle Run.  Hardly had the latter task been accomplished when a strong column of Federal infantry emerged from the forest and deployed for action.  Hooker’s division of 5,500 men, belonging to McClellan’s army, had joined Pope on the same day that Jackson had crossed the Rappahannock, and had been dispatched northwards from Warrenton Junction as soon as the news came in that Manassas Junction had been captured.  Hooker had been instructed to ascertain the strength of the enemy at Manassas, for Pope was still under the impression that the attack