deficiencies of the States; and if money could have effected the re-establishment of the Union, the war would have already reached a triumphant issue.  But the Northern Government had yet to learn that the accumulation of men, materiel, and supplies is not in itself sufficient for success.  Money alone cannot provide good generals, a trained staff, or an efficient cavalry; and so on this August morning 20,000 ragged Confederates, the soldiers of a country which ranked as the poorest of nations, had marched right round the rear of the Federal army, and were now halted in undisturbed possession of all that made that army an effective force.

Few generals have occupied a position so commanding as did Jackson on the morning of August 27.  His enemies would henceforward have to dance while he piped.  It was Jackson, and not Pope, who was to dictate the movements of the Federal army.  It was impossible that the latter could now maintain its position on the Rappahannock, and Lee’s strategy had achieved its end.  The capture of Manassas Junction, however, was only the first step in the campaign.  Pope, to restore his communications with Alexandria, would be compelled to fall back; but before he could be defeated the two Confederate wings must be united, and the harder part of the work would devolve on Jackson.  The Federals, at Warrenton, were nearer by five miles to Thoroughfare Gap, his shortest line of communication with Lee and Longstreet, than he was himself.  Washington held a large garrison, and the railway was available for the transit of the troops.  The fugitives from Manassas must already have given the alarm, and at any moment the enemy might appear.

If there were those in the Confederate ranks who considered the manoeuvres of their leader overbold, their misgivings were soon justified.

A train full of soldiers from Warrenton Junction put back on finding Ewell in possession of Bristoe Station; but a more determined effort was made from the direction of Alexandria.  So early as seven o’clock a brigade of infantry, accompanied by a battery, detrained on the north bank of Bull Run, and advanced in battle order against the Junction.* (* These troops were sent forward, without cavalry, by order of General Halleck.  O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 680.  The Federal Commander-in-Chief expected that the opposition would be slight.  He had evidently no suspicion of the length to which the daring of Lee and Jackson might have carried them.) The Federals, unaware that the depot was held in strength, expected to drive before them a few squadrons of cavalry.  But when several batteries opened a heavy fire, and heavy columns advanced against their flanks, the men broke in flight towards the bridge.  The Confederate infantry followed rapidly, and two Ohio regiments, which had just arrived from the Kanawha Valley, were defeated with heavy loss.  Fitzhugh Lee, who had fallen back before the enemy’s advance, was then ordered in pursuit.  The cars and railway bridge were destroyed; and during the day the brigade followed the fugitives as far as Burke’s Station, only twelve miles from Alexandria.