author.) It is only certain that we have record of few enterprises of greater daring than that which was then decided on; and no matter from whose brain it emanated, on Lee fell the burden of the responsibility; on his shoulders, and on his alone, rested the honour of the Confederate arms, the fate of Richmond, the independence of the South; and if we may suppose, so consonant was the design proposed with the strategy which Jackson had already practised, that it was to him its inception was due, it is still to Lee that we must assign the higher merit.  It is easy to conceive.  It is less easy to execute.  But to risk cause and country, name and reputation, on a single throw, and to abide the issue with unflinching heart, is the supreme exhibition of the soldier’s fortitude.

Lee’s decision was to divide his army.  Jackson, marching northwards, was to cross the Bull Run Mountains at Thoroughfare Gap, ten miles as the crow flies from the enemy’s right, and strike the railway which formed Pope’s line of supply.  The Federal commander, who would meanwhile be held in play by Longstreet, would be compelled to fall back in a north-easterly direction to save his communications, and thus be drawn away from McClellan.  Longstreet would then follow Jackson, and it was hoped that the Federals, disconcerted by these movements, might be attacked in detail or forced to fight at a disadvantage.  The risk, however, was very great.

An army of 55,000 men was about to march into a region occupied by 100,000,* (* Pope, 80,000; Washington and Aquia Creek, 20,000.  Lee was well aware, from the correspondence which Stuart had captured, if indeed he had not already inferred it, that Pope had been strictly enjoined to cover Washington, and that he was dependent on the railway for supplies.  There was not the slightest fear of his falling back towards Aquia Creek to join McClellan.) who might easily be reinforced to 150,000; and it was to march in two wings, separated from each other by two days’ march.  If Pope were to receive early warning of Jackson’s march, he might hurl his whole force on one or the other.  Moreover, defeat, with both Pope and McClellan between the Confederates and Richmond, spelt ruin and nothing less.  But as Lee said after the war, referring to the criticism evoked by manoeuvres, in this as in other of his campaigns, which were daring even to rashness, “Such criticism is obvious, but the disparity of force between the contending forces rendered the risks unavoidable."* (* The Army of Northern Virginia, Colonel Allan page 200.) In the present case the only alternative was an immediate retreat; and retreat, so long as the enemy was not fully concentrated, and there was a chance of dealing with him in detail, was a measure which neither Lee nor Jackson was ever willing to advise.