(Hooker’s Division, Kearney’s Division) 10,000 Fifth Corps:  Porter (Morell’s Division, Sykes’ Division) 10,000 Pennsylvania Reserves:  Reynolds 8000] that a strong force, drawn from the Kanawha Valley and elsewhere, was assembling at Washington; and that 150,000 men might be concentrated within a few days on the Rappahannock.  Lee, on learning McClellan’s destination, immediately asked that the troops which had been retained at Richmond should be sent to join him.  Mr. Davis assented, but it was not till the request had been repeated and time lost that the divisions of D.H.  Hill and McLaws’, two brigades of infantry, under J.G.  Walker, and Hampton’s cavalry brigade were ordered up.  Yet these reinforcements only raised Lee’s numbers to 75,000 men, and they were from eighty to a hundred miles distant by an indifferent railroad.

Nor was it possible to await their arrival.  Instant action was imperative.  But what action was possible?  A defensive attitude could only result in the Confederate army being forced back by superior strength; and retreat on Richmond would be difficult, for the Federals held the interior lines.  The offensive seemed out of the question.  Pope’s position was more favourable than before.  His army was massed, and reinforcements were close at hand.  His right flank was well secured.  The ford at Sulphur Springs and the Waterloo Bridge were both in his possession; north of the Springs rose the Bull Run Mountains, a range covered with thick forest, and crossed by few roads; and his left was protected by the march of McClellan’s army corps from Aquia Creek.  Even the genius of a Napoleon might well have been baffled by the difficulties in the way of attack.  But there were men in the Confederate army to whom overwhelming numbers and strong positions were merely obstacles to be overcome.

On August 24 Lee removed his headquarters to Jefferson, where Jackson was already encamped, and on the same evening, with Pope’s captured correspondence before them, the two generals discussed the problem.  What occurred at this council of war was never made public.  To use Lee’s words:  “A plan of operations was determined on;” but by whom it was suggested there is none to tell us.  “Jackson was so reticent,” writes Dr. McGuire, “that it was only by accident that we ever found out what he proposed to do, and there is no staff officer living (1897) who could throw any light on this matter.  The day before we started to march round Pope’s army I saw Lee and Jackson conferring together.  Jackson—­for him—­was very much excited, drawing with the toe of his boot a map in the sand, and gesticulating in a much more earnest way than he was in the habit of doing.  General Lee was simply listening, and after Jackson had got through, he nodded his head, as if acceding to some proposal.  I believe, from what occurred afterwards, that Jackson suggested the movement as it was made, but I have no further proof than the incident I have just mentioned."* (* Letter to the