But it was not to be.  The design was thwarted by one of those petty accidents which play so large a part in war.  Stuart had been instructed to lead the advance.  The only brigade at his disposal had not yet come up into line, but a message had been sent to appoint a rendezvous, and it was expected to reach Verdiersville, five miles from Raccoon Ford, on the night of the 17th.  Stuart’s message, however, was not sufficiently explicit.  Nothing was said of the exigencies of the situation; and the brigadier, General Fitzhugh Lee, not realising the importance of reaching Verdiersville on the 17th, marched by a circuitous route in order to replenish his supplies.  At nightfall he was still absent, and the omission of a few words in a simple order cost the Confederates dear.  Moreover, Stuart himself, who had ridden to Verdiersville with a small escort, narrowly escaped capture.  His plumed hat, with which the whole army was familiar, as well as his adjutant-general and his dispatch-box, fell into the hands of a Federal reconnoitring party; and among the papers brought to Pope was found a letter from General Lee, disclosing the fact that Jackson had been strongly reinforced.

In consequence of the absence of Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade, the movement was postponed until the morning of the 20th.  The Commander-in-Chief was of opinion that the horses, exhausted by their long march, would require some rest before they were fit for the hard work he proposed for them.  Jackson, for once in opposition, urged that the movement should go forward.  His signal officer on Clark’s Mountain reported that the enemy was quiet, and even extending his right up stream.  The location of the Federal divisions had been already ascertained.  The cavalry was not required to get information.  There was no need, therefore, to wait till Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade was fit for movement.  Jackson had, with his own command, a sufficient number of squadrons to protect the front and flanks of the whole army; and the main object was not to cut the enemy’s communications, but to turn his left and annihilate him.  Pope was still isolated, still unconscious of his danger, and the opportunity might never return.

The suggestion, however, was overruled, and “it was fortunate,” says one of Pope’s generals, “that Jackson was not in command of the Confederates on the night of August 17; for the superior force of the enemy must have overwhelmed us, if we could not have escaped, and escape on that night was impossible."* (* General George H. Gordon.  The Army of Virginia page 9.)

It is probable, however, that other causes induced General Lee to hold his hand.  There is good reason to believe that it was not only the cavalry that was unprepared.  The movement from Richmond had been rapid, and both vehicles and supplies had been delayed.  Nor were all the generals so avaricious of time as Jackson.  It was impossible, it was urged, to move without some food in the waggons.  Jackson