Confederate cavalry, and had retired on Sperryville.  He may accordingly be excused for imagining that a retreat which had been postponed for two days was precipitate.  But dead men, dead horses, and old arms which the Confederates had probably exchanged for those which were captured, several wounded Federals, who had been prisoners in the enemy’s hands, and one wounded Confederate, a major of horse-artillery and not a staff officer at all, are hardly evidences of undue haste or great confusion.  Moreover, in the list of Confederate casualties only thirty-one men were put down as missing.

It is true that Jackson need not have retreated so far as Gordonsville.  He might have halted behind the Rapidan, where the bluffs on the south bank overlook the level country to the north.  But Jackson’s manoeuvres, whether in advance or retreat, were invariably actuated by some definite purpose, and what that purpose was he explains in his dispatches.* (* O.R. volume 12 part 2 page 185.) “I remained in position until the night of the 11th, when I returned to the vicinity of Gordonsville, in order to avoid being attacked by the vastly superior force in front of me, and with the hope that by thus falling back, General Pope would be induced to follow me until I should be reinforced.”  That Pope, had he been left to his own judgment, would have crossed the Rapidan is certain.  “The enemy,” he reported, “has retreated to Gordonsville...I shall move forward on Louisa Court House as soon as Burnside arrives.”  He was restrained, however, by the more wary Halleck.  “Beware of a snare,” wrote the Commander-in-Chief.  “Feigned retreats are ‘Secesh’ tactics.”  How wise was this warning, and what would have been the fate of Pope had he recklessly crossed the Rapidan, the next chapter will reveal.

CHAPTER 2.16.  GROVETON AND THE SECOND MANASSAS.

During the summer of 1862 the stirring events in the Western hemisphere attracted universal attention.  All eyes were fixed on Richmond.  The fierce fighting on the Chickahominy, and the defeat of the invaders, excited Europe hardly less than it did the North.  The weekly mails were eagerly awaited.  The newspapers devoted many columns to narrative, criticism, and prediction.  The strategy and tactics of the rival armies were everywhere discussed, and the fact that almost every single item of intelligence came from a Northern source served only as a whet to curiosity.  The vast territory controlled by the Confederacy was so completely cut off from the outer world that an atmosphere of mystery enveloped the efforts of the defence.  “The Southern States,” it has been said, “stood in the attitude of a beleaguered fortress.  The war was in truth a great siege; the fortress covered an area of more than 700,000 square miles, and the lines of investment around it extended over more than 10,000 miles.”  Within the circle of Federal cannon and Federal cruisers only