the troops which had issued from the forest, but the
whole Confederate line was shaken. The normal,
though less brilliant, course would have been to have
re-established the front, and not till that had been
done to have ventured on the counter-stroke.
Jackson, with that quick intuition which is possessed
by few, saw and seized his opportunity while the Federals
were still pressing the attack. One of Hill’s
brigades was sent to support the centre, and, almost
in the same breath, six others, a mass of 7000 or
8000 men, were ordered to attack the enemy’s
right, to outflank it, and to roll back his whole
line upon Ewell, who was instructed at the same moment
to outflank the left. Notwithstanding some delay
in execution, Ewell’s inability to advance,
and the charge of the Federal cavalry, this vigorous
blow changed the whole aspect of the battle within
a short half-hour. Conceived in a moment, in
the midst of wild excitement and fierce tumult, delivered
with all the strength available, it cannot be judged
otherwise than as the mark of a great captain.
Few battles, indeed, bear the impress of a single
personality more clearly than Cedar Run. From
the first cannon-shot of the advanced guard until the
last volley in the midnight forest, one will directed
every movement. The field was no small one.
The fight was full of startling changes. It was
no methodical conflict, but a fierce struggle at close
quarters, the lines swaying to and fro, and the ground
covered with confused masses of men and guns, with
flying batteries and broken regiments. But the
turmoil of battle found a master. The strong brain
was never clearer than when the storm raged most fiercely.
Wherever his presence was most needed there Jackson
was seen, rallying the fugitives, reinforcing the
centre, directing the counterstroke, and leading the
pursuit. And he was well supported. His subordinate
generals carried out their orders to the letter.
But every order which bore upon the issue of the battle
came from the lips of one man.
If Northern writers have overlooked the skill with
which Jackson controlled the fight, they have at the
same time misunderstood his action two days later.
His retreat to Gordonsville has been represented as
a flight. He is said to have abandoned many wounded
and stragglers, and to have barely saved his baggage.
In all this there is not one word of truth. We
have, indeed, the report of the Federal officer who
conducted the pursuit. “The flight of the
enemy after Saturday’s fight was most precipitate
and in great confusion. His old camp was strewn
with dead men, horses, and arms...A good many (Federal)
prisoners, wounded in Saturday’s fight, were
found almost abandoned. Major Andrews, chief
of artillery to General Jackson, was found, badly
wounded, at Crooked Run, in charge of an assistant
surgeon.” It is hardly necessary to say
that General Buford, the officer thus reporting, had
not been present at the battle. He had been out
off with his four regiments by the advance of the