Jackson’s tactics have been criticised as severely as his strategy.  Because his first line was broken it is asserted that he narrowly escaped a serious defeat, and that had the two forces been equally matched Banks would have won a decisive victory.  This is hardly sound criticism.  In the first place, Jackson was perfectly well aware that the two forces were not equally matched.  If he had had no more men than Banks, would he have disposed his forces as he did?  He would scarcely have occupied the same extent of ground with 9000 men that he did with 20,000.  His actual front, when Banks attacked, was two miles long.  With smaller numbers he would have occupied a smaller front, and would have retained a sufficient force in reserve.  In the second place, it is generally possible for an inferior force, if it puts every man into the fighting-line, to win some measure of success.  But such success, as was shown at Kernstown, can seldom be more than temporary; and if the enemy makes good use of his reserves must end in defeat.

So far from Jackson’s tactics being indifferent, it is very easy to show that they were exactly the contrary.  Immediately he came upon the field he sent Ewell to occupy Slaughter Mountain, a mile distant from his line of march; and the huge hill, with batteries planted on its commanding terraces, not only secured his flank, but formed a strong pivot for his attack on the Federal right.  The preliminary operations were conducted with due deliberation.  There was no rushing forward to the attack while the enemy’s strength was still uncertain.  The ridge occupied by the enemy, so far as possible, was thoroughly reconnoitred, and every rifled gun was at once brought up.  The artillery positions were well selected, for, notwithstanding their superiority of ordnance, the Federal batteries suffered far more heavily than the Confederates.  The one weak point was the extreme left, and to this point Jackson in person directed the attention of his subordinates.  “Had reinforcements,” says Colonel Garnett, who commanded the troops that first gave way, “momentarily expected, arrived ten minutes sooner no disaster would have happened."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 2 page 201.) That the point was not strengthened, that the Stonewall Brigade was not posted in second line behind the 1st Virginia, and that only a staff officer and an orderly were sent to patrol the forest to the westward, instead of several companies of infantry, was in no way due to the general-in-chief.

Nor was the position of A.P.  Hill’s division, which, in conjunction with the Stonewall Brigade, averted the disaster and won the victory, a fortuitous circumstance.  Before the attack began it had been directed to this point, and the strong counterstroke which was made by these fresh troops was exactly the manoeuvre which the situation demanded.  At the time it was ordered the Confederate left and centre were hard pressed.  The Stonewall Brigade had checked