During the first week in August Jackson, protecting the Virginia Central Railroad, was confronted by a much superior force.  He could expect no further reinforcements, for McClellan was still near Richmond, and according to the latest information was actually advancing.  On the 7th he heard that Pope also was moving forward from Hazel Run, and had pushed a portion of his army as far as Culpeper.  In face of the overwhelming strength of the Federal cavalry it was impossible, if he occupied a defensive position, that he could protect the railroad; for while their infantry and artillery held him in front, their swarming squadrons would operate at their leisure on either flank.  Nor could a defensive position have been long maintained.  There were no natural obstacles, neither river nor mountains, to protect Jackson’s flanks; and the railroad—­his line of supply—­would have been parallel to his front.  In a vigorous offensive, then, should opportunity offer, lay his best chance of success.  That opportunity was offered by the unsupported advance of the Federal detachment under Banks.  It is true that Jackson hoped to achieve more than the defeat of this comparatively small force.  If he could have seized Culpeper he might have been able to deal with Pope’s army in detail; he saw before him another Valley campaign, and he was fully justified in believing that victory on the Rapidan would bring McClellan back to Washington.

His anticipations were not altogether realised.  He crushed the detachment immediately opposed to him, but he failed to seize Culpeper, and McClellan had already been ordered, although this was unknown to the Confederates, to evacuate the Peninsula.  But it cannot be fairly said that his enterprise was therefore useless.  Strategically it was a fine conception.  The audacity of his manoeuvre was not the least of its merits.  For an army of 24,000 men, weak in cavalry, to advance against an army of 47,000, including 5000 horsemen, was the very height of daring.  But it was the daring of profound calculation.  As it was, Jackson ran little risk.  He succeeded in his immediate object.  He crushed Pope’s advanced guard, and he retreated unmolested, bearing with him the prisoners, the colours, and the arms which he had captured.  If he did not succeed in occupying Culpeper, it was not his fault.  Fortune was against him.  On the very day that he had moved forward Pope had done the same.  Banks and McDowell were at Culpeper on the 8th, and Sigel received orders to move the same day.

Nevertheless the expedition was far from barren in result.  If Jackson failed to defeat Pope altogether, he at least singed his beard.  It was well worth the loss of 1300 men to have destroyed two whole divisions under the very eyes of the general commanding a superior army.  A few days later Pope was to feel the want of these gallant regiments,* (* So late as August 28, Pope reported that Banks’ troops were much demoralised.  O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 653.) and the confidence of his troops in their commander was much shaken.  Moreover, the blow was felt at Washington.  There was no more talk of occupying Gordonsville.  Pope was still full of ardour.  But Halleck forbade him to advance further than the Rapidan, where Burnside would reinforce him; and McClellan was ordered to hasten the departure of his troops from the Peninsula.