August 12.

His position on Cedar Run, tactically strong, was strategically unsound.  The intelligence he had obtained was substantially correct.  With the exception of five regiments of McDowell’s cavalry, only Banks’ army corps had been engaged at Cedar Run.  But during the evening both Sigel and McDowell had reached the field, and it was their troops which had checked the Confederate pursuit.  In fact, on the morning of the 10th, Pope, besides 5000 cavalry, had 22,000 fresh troops in addition to those which had been defeated, and which he estimated at 5000 effectives, wherewith to bar the way to Culpeper.  McDowell’s second division, 10,000 strong, on the march from Fredericksburg, was not more than twenty mites east of Slaughter Mountain.

In front, therefore, Jackson was confronted by superior numbers.  At the least estimate, 32,000 men were posted beyond Cedar Run, and 10,000 under King were coming up from Fredericksburg.  Nor was a preponderance of numbers the only obstacle with which Jackson had to deal.  A direct attack on Pope was impossible, but a turning movement, by way of James City, might have found him unprepared, or a swift advance might have crushed King.  But for the execution of either manoeuvre a large force of cavalry was absolutely essential.  By this means alone could the march be concealed and a surprise effected.  In view, however, of the superior strength of the Federal horsemen such a project was unfeasible, and retreat was manifestly the only alternative.  Nevertheless, it was not till he was assured that no further opportunity would be given him that Jackson evacuated his position.  For two days he remained on Cedar Run, within two miles of the Federal outposts, defying his enemy to battle.  If an attack on the Federals promised nothing but defeat, it was not so sure that Pope with 27,000 infantry, of whom a considerable number had just tasted defeat, would be able to oust Jackson with 22,000 from a position which the latter had selected; and it was not till King’s approach gave the Federals an overwhelming superiority that the Confederates withdrew behind the Rapidan.

With sublime audacity, as soon as his enemy had disappeared, Pope claimed the battle of Cedar Run as a Federal success.  Carried away by enthusiasm he ventured to forecast the future.  “It is safe to predict,” he declared in a general order, “that this is only the first of a series of victories which shall make the Army of Virginia famous in the land.”  That such language, however, was the natural result of intense relief at Jackson’s retreat may be inferred from his telegrams, which, unfortunately for his reputation, have been preserved in the archives of Washington.  Nor was his attitude on the 10th and 11th that of a victorious commander.  For two days he never stirred from his position.  He informed Halleck that the enemy was in very superior force, that Stuart and Longstreet had joined Jackson, and while the Confederates were withdrawing he was telegraphing that he would certainly be attacked the next morning.