Sperryville would march by Woodville and Griffinsburg.  His centre had already moved forward from Warrenton.  His left wing at Falmouth, north of Fredericksburg, would march by Bealeton and Brandy Station, or by Richardsville and Georgetown.  As all these roads were several miles apart, and the lateral communications were indifferent, the three columns, during the movement on Culpeper Court House, would be more or less isolated; and if the Confederates could seize the point at which the roads met, it might be possible to keep them apart, to prevent them combining for action, and to deal with them in detail.  Pope, in fact, had embarked on a manoeuvre which is always dangerous in face of a vigilant and energetic enemy.  Deceived by the passive attitude which Jackson had hitherto maintained, and confident in the strength of his cavalry, which held Robertson River, a stream some ten miles south of Culpeper Court House, he had pushed a small force far in advance, and was preparing to cross Hazel Run in several widely separated columns.  He had no apprehension that he might be attacked during the process.  Most generals in Jackson’s situation, confronted by far superior numbers, would have been content with occupying a defensive position in front of Gordonsville, and neither Pope nor Halleck had gauged as yet the full measure of their opponent’s enterprise.  So confident was the Federal Commander-in-Chief that General Cox, with 11,000 men, was ordered to march from Lewisburg, ninety miles south-west of Staunton, to join Pope at Charlottesville.* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 281.)

Jackson’s force was composed as follows:—­

Jackson’s Own Division (commanded by Winder) 3000

Ewell 7550

A.P.  Hill (The Light Division). 12,000

Cavalry 1200

23,750.

Jackson was by no means displeased when he learned who was in command of the Federal advance.  “Banks is in front of me,” he said to Dr. McGuire, “he is always ready to fight;” and then, laughing, he added as if to himself, “and he generally gets whipped.”

The Confederate regiments, as a rule, were very weak.  The losses of the Seven Days, of Winchester, of Cross Keys, and of Port Republic had not yet been replaced.  Companies had dwindled down to sections.  Brigades were no stronger than full battalions, and the colonel was happy who could muster 200 muskets.  But the waste of the campaign was not altogether an evil.  The weak and sickly had been weeded out.  The faint-hearted had disappeared, and if many of the bravest had fallen before Richmond, those who remained were hardy and experienced soldiers.  The army that lay round Gordonsville was the best that Jackson had yet commanded.  The horses, which had become almost useless in the Peninsula, had soon regained condition on the rich pastures at the foot of the South-west Mountains.  Nearly every man had seen service.  The officers were no longer novices.  The troops