by one from General von Steinwehr, a German brigadier, directing the arrest of five prominent citizens, to be held as hostages, and to suffer death in the event of any soldiers being shot by bushwhackers.  The Confederate Government retaliated by declaring that Pope and his officers were not entitled to be considered as soldiers.  If captured they were to be imprisoned so long as their orders remained unrepealed; and in the event of any unarmed Confederate citizens being tried and shot, an equal number of Federal prisoners were to be hanged.  It need hardly be added that the operations north of Gordonsville were watched with peculiar interest by the South.  “This new general,” it was said to Jackson, “claims your attention.”  “And, please God, he shall have it,” was the reply.

Nevertheless, with all his peculiar characteristics, Pope was no despicable foe.  The Federal cavalry were employed with a boldness which had not hitherto been seen.  Their outposts were maintained twenty miles in advance of the army.  Frequent reconnaissances were made.  A regiment of Jackson’s cavalry was defeated at Orange Court House, with a loss of 60 or 70 men, and scouting parties penetrated to within a few miles of Gordonsville.  Even Banks was spurred to activity, and learned at last that information is generally to be obtained if it is resolutely sought.* (* “We must constantly feel the enemy, know where he is, and what he is doing.  Vigilance, activity, and a precaution that has a considerable mixture of audacity in it will carry you through many difficulties.”  Such were his instructions to an officer of the regular army!  It was unfortunate he had not acted on those sound principles in the Valley.) Very little that occurred within the Confederate lines escaped the vigilance of the enemy; and although Jackson’s numbers were somewhat overestimated, Pope’s cavalry, energetically led by two able young officers, Generals Buford and Bayard, did far better service than McClellan’s detectives.  Jackson had need of all his prudence.  Including the Light Division, his force amounted to no more than 24,000 men; and if Pope handled his whole army with as much skill as he used his cavalry, it would go hard with Gordonsville. 24,000 men could hardly be expected to arrest the march of 47,000 unless the larger force should blunder.

During the first week in August events began to thicken.  Stuart made a strong reconnaissance towards Fredericksburg, and administered a check to the Federal scouting parties in that quarter.  But McClellan threw forward a division and occupied Malvern Hill, and it became evident that Pope also was meditating a further advance.

Jackson, for the purpose of luring him forward, and also of concealing Hill’s arrival, had drawn back his cavalry, and moved his infantry south of Gordonsville.  Pope was warned from Washington that this was probably a ruse.  His confidence, however, was not to be shaken.  “Within ten days,” he reported, “unless the enemy is heavily reinforced from Richmond, I shall be in possession of Gordonsville and Charlottesville.”