to comply with his lieutenant’s request for such aid as would enable him to assume the offensive.  The army covering Richmond was much smaller than McClellan’s, and the Confederates were aware that a large reinforcement for the latter, under General Burnside, had landed in the Peninsula.  But assistance was promised in case Pope advanced so far south that troops could be detached without risk to Richmond.  Pope, in fact, was too far off, and Jackson was to entice him forward.

A week, however, passed away without any movement on the part of McClellan.  He knew that Lee’s army was diminished; and it was believed at his headquarters that “Jackson had started towards the Valley with 60,000 to 80,000 troops."* (* O.R. volume 11 part 3 page 334.) He knew that there was no large force within ten miles of his outposts, and if the President would send him 20,000 or 30,000 more men he said that he was ready to march on Richmond.  But, as yet, he had not observed the opportunity for which, according to his own account, he was so carefully watching.  Pope was far more enterprising.  His cavalry had burned the railway depot at Beaver Dam, destroyed some Confederate stores, cut the line at several points, and threatened Hanover Junction.  Stuart, with his cavalry division, was immediately sent northwards, and Lee ordered A.P.  Hill to Gordonsville.

Jackson’s letters to headquarters at this period are missing.  But Lee’s answers indicate the tenor of the views therein expressed.  On July 27 the Commander-in-Chief wrote:—­

“I have received your dispatch of the 26th instant.  I will send A.P.  Hill’s division and the Second Brigade of Louisiana volunteers to you...I want Pope to be suppressed...A.P.  Hill you will, I think, find a good officer, with whom you can consult, and by advising with your division commanders as to your movements, much trouble will be saved you in arranging details, and they can act more intelligently.  I wish to save you trouble from my increasing your command.  Cache your troops as much as possible till you can strike your blow, and be prepared to return to me when done, if necessary.  I will endeavour to keep General McClellan quiet till it is over, if rapidly executed.”

This letter, besides containing a delicate hint that extreme reticence is undesirable, evidently refers to some plan proposed by Jackson.  Whatever this may have been, it is certain that both he and Lee were in close accord.  They believed that the best method of protecting the railway was, in Lee’s words, “to find the main body of the enemy and drive it,” and they were agreed that there should be no more Malvern Hills.  “You are right,” says Lee on August 4, “in not attacking them in their strong and chosen positions.  They ought always to be turned as you propose, and thus force them on to more favourable ground.”

(Map of the environs of Warrenton, Virginia)