Jackson’s views were considered by Mr. Davis.  For the present, however, they were disregarded.  The situation, in the opinion of the Government, was still critical.  McClellan might be reinforced by sea.  He might be superseded by a more energetic commander, and the Federals might then cross to the right bank of the James, cut the railways which connected Richmond with the South, and turn the line of fortifications.  The losses of the Seven Days had reduced the Confederate strength to 60,000.  Under such circumstances it was not considered safe to remove the army from the capital.  Jackson, however, was entrusted with a more congenial duty than watching an enemy who, he was absolutely convinced, had no intention of leaving his intrenchments.

July 13.

His longing for active work was gratified by an order to march westward.  Lee, finding McClellan immovable, had recourse to his former strategy.  He determined to play once more on Lincoln’s fears.  The Army of Virginia, under the command of Pope, defended Washington.  Would the Northern Government, when the news came that Stonewall Jackson was returning to the Shenandoah, deem this force sufficient to protect the capital?  Would they not rather think it necessary to recall McClellan?  The experiment was worth trying.  After some delay in recovering from the disorganisation caused by the disasters in the Valley, Pope had assembled his army east of the Blue Ridge, near the sources of the Rappahannock.  Sperryvile, his advanced post, was no more than forty miles north of the Virginia Central Railway, and his cavalry was already advancing.  It was essential that the railway, the chief line of supply of the Confederate army, should be protected; and Jackson was instructed to halt near Gordonsville.

July 16.

On the 16th his leading brigades reached their destination.  Their arrival was opportune.  The Federal cavalry, with a strong infantry support, was already threatening Gordonsville.  On learning, however, that the town was occupied they at once fell back.

Jackson, as soon as his command was up, and he had had time to ascertain the Federal strength, applied for reinforcements.  His own numbers were very small.  The divisions of D.H.  Hill and Whiting had remained at Richmond.  The Army of the Valley, reduced to its original elements, was no more than 11,000 strong.  Pope’s army consisted of 47,000 men.* (* Sigel, 13,000; Banks, 11,000; McDowell, 18,000; Bayard’s and Bulord’s cavalry, 5000.) But the Federals were scattered over a wide front.  Sigel, a German who had succeeded Fremont, was near Sperryville, and Banks lay close to Sigel.  Each of these officers commanded an army corps of two divisions.  Of McDowell’s army corps, Ricketts’ division held Warrenton, twenty-five miles east of Banks; while King’s division was retained at Fredericksburg, forty miles south-east of Ricketts’.  Such dispersion seemed to invite attack.  Lee, however, found it impossible