were the President and his nephew.  Davis and Lee then drew to the table, and entered into an animated military discussion.  Lee told the President the news which the scouts were bringing in, of horrible mud, and of abandoned arms and baggage waggons.  They then debated at length what was to be done next.  McClellan was certainly retiring, but whether as beaten or as only manoeuvring was not apparent, nor was the direction of his retreat at all clear.  Was he aiming for some point on the lower James where he might embark and get away? or at some point on the upper James—­say Shirley, or Bermuda Hundred—­where he could cross the river (he had pontoons and gunboats) and advance on Richmond from the south?  Such were the questions which came up, and at length it was decided that the army should make no movement until further information had been received.  The enemy was not to be pursued until Stuart’s cavalry, which had arrived the previous evening at Nance’s Shop, should obtain reliable information.

“Jackson, meanwhile, sat silent in his corner.  I watched his face.  The expression, changing from surprise to dissent, and lastly to intense mortification, showed clearly the tenor of his thoughts.  He knew that McClellan was defeated, that he was retreating and not manoeuvring.  He knew that his troops were disorganised, that sleeplessness, fasting, bad weather, and disaster must have weakened their morale.  He heard it said by General Lee that the scouts reported the roads so deep in mud that the artillery could not move, that our men were wet and wearied.  But Jackson’s mind reasoned that where the Federals could march the Confederates could follow, and that a decisive victory was well worth a great effort."* (* Letter to the author.  Dr. McGuire writes to the same effect.)

July 3.

The decision of the council of war was that the army should move the next morning in the direction of Harrison’s Landing.  Longstreet, whose troops had not been engaged at Malvern Hill, was to lead the way.  But the operations of this day were without result.  The line of march was by Carter’s Mill and the river road.  But after the troops had been set in motion, it was found that the river road had been obstructed by the enemy, and Lee directed Longstreet to countermarch to the Charles City cross roads and move on Evelington Heights.* (* Evelington Heights are between Rawling’s Mill Pond and Westover.) But ignorance of the country and inefficient guides once more played into the enemy’s hands, and when night closed the troops were still some distance from the Federal outposts.