Had the Federals followed up the repulse with a strong counter-attack the victory of Malvern Hill might have been more decisive than that of Gaines’ Mill.  It is true that neither Longstreet nor A.P.  Hill had been engaged, and that three of Jackson’s divisions, his own, Whiting’s and Ewell’s, had suffered little.  But Magruder and D.H.  Hill, whose commands included at least 30,000 muskets, one half of Lee’s infantry, had been completely crushed, and Holmes on the river road was too far off to lend assistance.  The fatal influence of a continued retreat had paralysed, however, the initiative of the Federal generals.  Intent only on getting away unscathed, they neglected, like McClellan at Gaines’ Mill, to look for opportunities, forgetting that when an enemy is pursuing in hot haste he is very apt to expose himself.  Jackson had acted otherwise at Port Republic.

The loss of over 5000 men was not the worst which had befallen the Confederates.  “The next morning by dawn,” says one of Ewell’s brigadiers, “I went off to ask for orders, when I found the whole army in the utmost disorder—­thousands of straggling men were asking every passer-by for their regiments; ambulances, waggons, and artillery obstructing every road, and altogether, in a drenching rain, presenting a scene of the most woeful and disheartening confusion."* (* Trimble’s Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 619.) The reports of other officers corroborate General Trimble’s statement, and there can be no question that demoralisation had set in.  Whether, if the Federals had used their large reserves with resolution, and, as the Confederates fell back down the slopes, had followed with the bayonet, the demoralisation would not have increased and spread, must remain in doubt.  Not one of the Southern generals engaged has made public his opinion.  There is but one thing certain, that with an opponent so blind to opportunity as McClellan a strong counterstroke was the last thing to be feared.  After witnessing the opening of the attack, the Federal commander, leaving the control of the field to Porter, had ridden off to Harrison’s Landing, eight miles down the James, whither his trains, escorted by the Fourth Army Corps, had been directed, and where he had determined to await reinforcements.  The Federal troops, moreover, although they had withstood the charge of the Confederate infantry with unbroken ranks, had not fought with the same spirit as they had displayed at Gaines’ Mill.  General Hunt, McClellan’s chief of artillery, to whose admirable disposition of the batteries the victory was largely due, wrote that “the battle was desperately contested, and frequently trembled in the balance.  The last attack...was nearly successful; but we won from the fact that we had kept our reserves in hand."* (* Three horse-batteries and eight 32-pr. howitzers were “brought up to the decisive point at the close of the day, thus bringing every gun of this large artillery force (the artillery reserve)