that he is doing what that superior, were he present, would approve.  Apply this rule to the situation at White Oak Swamp.  For anything Jackson knew it was possible that Longstreet and Hill might defeat the Federals opposed to them without his aid.  In such case, Lee, believing Jackson to be still on the left flank, would have ordered him to prevent the enemy’s escape by the Long Bridge.  What would Lee have said had his “further orders” found Jackson marching to the Charles City road, with the Long Bridge some miles in rear?  The truth is that the principle of marching to the sound of the cannon, though always to be borne in mind, cannot be invariably followed.  The only fair criticism on Jackson’s conduct is that he should have informed Lee of his inability to force the passage across the Swamp, and have held three divisions in readiness to march to Glendale.  This, so far as can be ascertained, was left undone, but the evidence is merely negative.

Except for this apparent omission, it cannot be fairly said that Jackson was in the slightest degree responsible for the failure of the Confederate operations.  If the truth be told, Lee’s design was by no means perfect.  It had two serious defects.  In the first place, it depended for success on the co-operation of several converging columns, moving over an intricate country, of which the Confederates had neither accurate maps nor reliable information.  The march of the columns was through thick woods, which not only impeded intercommunication, but provided the enemy with ample material for obstructing the roads, and Jackson’s line of march was barred by a formidable obstacle in White Oak Swamp, an admirable position for a rear-guard.  In the second place, concentration at the decisive point was not provided for.  The staff proved incapable of keeping the divisions in hand.  Magruder was permitted to wander to and fro after the fashion of D’Erlon between Quatre Bras and Ligny.  Holmes was as useless as Grouchy at Waterloo.  Huger did nothing, although some of his brigades, when the roads to the front were found to be obstructed, might easily have been drawn off to reinforce Longstreet.  The cavalry had gone off on a raid to the White House, instead of crossing the Chickahominy and harassing the enemy’s eastward flank; and at the decisive point only two divisions were assembled, 20,000 men all told, and these two divisions attacked in succession instead of simultaneously.  Had Magruder and Holmes, neither of whom would have been called upon to march more than thirteen miles, moved on Frayser’s Farm, and had part of Huger’s division been brought over to the same point, the Federals would in all probability have been irretrievably defeated.  It is easy to be wise after the event.  The circumstances were extraordinary.  An army of 75,000 men was pursuing an army of 95,000, of which 65,000, when the pursuit began, were perfectly fresh troops.  The problem was, indeed, one of exceeding difficulty; but, in justice to the reputation of his lieutenants, it is only fair to say that Lee’s solution was not a masterpiece.