It is difficult to conceive that his scrupulous regard for truth, displayed in every action of his life, should have yielded in this one instance to his pride.  He was perfectly aware of the necessity of aiding Longstreet; and if, owing to the obstacles enumerated in his report, he thought the task impossible, his opinion, as that of a man who as difficulties accumulated became the more determined to overcome them, must be regarded with respect.  The critics, it is possible, have forgotten for the moment that the condition of the troops is a factor of supreme importance in military operations.  General D.H.  Hill has told us that “Jackson’s own corps was worn out by long and exhausting marches, and reduced in numbers by numerous sanguinary battles; “* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 389.) and he records his conviction that pity for his troops had much to do with the general’s inaction.  Hill would have probably come nearer the truth if he had said that the tired regiments were hardly to be trusted in a desperate assault, unsupported by artillery, on a position which was even stronger than that which they had stormed with such loss at Gaines’ Mill.

Had Jackson thrown two columns across the fords—­which the cavalry, according to Munford, had not found easy,—­and attempted to deploy on the further bank, it was exceedingly probable that they would have been driven back with tremendous slaughter.  The refusal of the troops to work at the bridge under fire was in itself a sign that they had little stomach for hard fighting.

It may be argued that it was Jackson’s duty to sacrifice his command in order to draw off troops from Glendale.  But on such unfavourable ground the sacrifice would have been worse than useless.  The attack repulsed—­and it could hardly have gone otherwise—­Franklin, leaving a small rear-guard to watch the fords, would have been free to turn nearly his whole strength against Longstreet.  It is quite true, as a tactical principle, that demonstrations, such as Jackson made with his artillery, are seldom to be relied upon to hold an enemy in position.  When the first alarm has passed off, and the defending general becomes aware that nothing more than a feint is intended, he will act as did the Federals, and employ his reserves elsewhere.  A vigorous attack is, almost invariably, the only means of keeping him to his ground.  But an attack which is certain to be repulsed, and to be repulsed in quick time, is even less effective than a demonstration.  It may be the precursor of a decisive defeat.

But it is not so much for his failure to force the passage at White Oak Swamp that Jackson has been criticised, as for his failure to march to Frayser’s Farm on finding that the Federal position was impregnable.  “When, on the forenoon of the 30th,” writes Longstreet, “Jackson found his way blocked by Franklin, he had time to march to the head of it (White Oak Swamp), and across to the Charles City road, in season for the engagement at Frayser’s Farm [Glendale], the distance being about four miles."* (* From Manassas to Appomattox page 150.)