Having ascertained that the enemy was present in great strength on the further bank, that every road was obstructed, and that there was no means of carrying his artillery over the creek, or favourable ground on which his infantry could act, Jackson gave up all hope of aiding Longstreet.

That the obstacles which confronted him were serious there can be no question.  His smooth-bore guns, although superior in number, were unable to beat down the fire of the rifled batteries.  The enemy’s masses were well hidden.  The roads were blocked, the stream was swollen, the banks marshy, and although infantry could cross them, the fords which had proved difficult for the cavalry would have stopped the artillery, the ammunition waggons, and the ambulances; while the Federal position, on the crest of a long open slope, was exceedingly strong.  Jackson, as his report shows, maturely weighed these difficulties, and came to the conclusion that he could do no good by sending over his infantry alone.  It was essential, it is true, to detain as many as possible of the enemy on the banks of the Swamp, while Longstreet, Hill, Huger, and Magruder dealt with the remainder; and this he fully realised, but it is by no means improbable that he considered the heavy fire of his guns and the threatening position of his infantry would have this effect.

It is interesting to note how far this hope, supposing that he entertained it, was fulfilled.  Two divisions of Federal infantry and three batteries—­a total of 22,000 men—­defended the passage at White Oak Bridge against 27,000 Confederates, including Wright; and a detached force of infantry and guns was posted at Brackett’s Ford.*

(* General Heintzleman, commanding the Federal 3rd Corps, reports that he had placed a force at Brackett’s Ford (O.R. volume 11 part 2 page 100).  General Slocum (6th Corps) sent infantry and a 12-pounder howitzer (O.R. volume 11 part 2 page 435) to the same point; and Seeley’s battery of the 3rd Corps was also engaged here (O.R. volume 11 part 2 page 106).  The force at White Oak Bridge was constituted as follows:—­

Smith’s Division of the 6th Corps.

Richardson’s Division....,, 2nd Corps. 
Dana’s Brigade }

Sully’s Brigade Sedgwick’s Division, 2nd Corps.

Naglee’s Brigade, Peck’s Division, 4th Corps.)

On the Confederate artillery opening fire, two brigades were sent up from near Glendale, but when it was found that this fire was not followed up by an infantry attack, these brigades, with two others in addition, were sent over to reinforce the troops which were engaged with Longstreet.  When these facts became known; when it was clear that had Jackson attacked vigorously, the Federals would hardly have dared to weaken their line along White Oak Swamp, and that, in these circumstances, Longstreet and A.P.  Hill would probably have seized the Quaker road, his failure to cross the creek exposed him to criticism.  Not only did his brother-generals complain of his inaction, but Franklin, the Federal commander immediately opposed to him, writing long afterwards, made the following comments:—­