This was valuable information, but still the line of retreat had not yet been ascertained.  The Federals might retreat to some point on the James River, due south, there meeting their transports, or they might march down the Peninsula to Yorktown and Fortress Monroe.  “In the latter event,” says Lee, “it was necessary that our troops should continue on the north bank of the river, and until the intention of General McClellan was discovered it was deemed injudicious to change their disposition.  Ewell was therefore ordered to proceed to Bottom’s Bridge, and the cavalry to watch the bridges below.  No certain indications of a retreat to the James River were discovered by our forces (Magruder) on the south side of the Chickahominy, and late in the afternoon the enemy’s works were reported to be fully manned.  Below (south of) the enemy’s works the country was densely wooded and intersected by impassable swamps, at once concealing his movements and precluding reconnaissances except by the regular roads, all of which were strongly guarded.  The bridges over the Chickahominy in rear of the enemy were destroyed, and their reconstruction impracticable in the presence of his whole army and powerful batteries.  We were therefore compelled to wait until his purpose should be developed."* (* Lee’s Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 pages 493 and 494.)

During the day, therefore, the Confederate army remained on the battle-field, waiting for the game to bolt.  In the evening, however, signs of a general movement were reported in rear of the intrenchments at Seven Pines; and as nothing had been observed by the cavalry on the Chickahominy, Lee, rightly concluding that McClellan was retreating to the James, issued orders for the pursuit to be taken up the next morning.

But to intercept the enemy before he could fortify a position, covered by the fire of his gunboats, on the banks of the James, was a difficult operation.  The situation demanded rapid marching, close concert, and delicate manoeuvres.  The Confederate army was in rear of the Federals, and separated from them by the Chickahominy, and, to reach the James, McClellan had only fourteen miles to cover.  But the country over which he had to pass was still more intricate, and traversed by even fewer roads, than the district which had hitherto been the theatre of operations.  Across his line of march ran the White Oak Swamp, bordered by thick woods and a wide morass, and crossed by only one bridge.  If he could transfer his whole army south of this stream, without molestation, he would find himself within six miles of his gunboats; and as his left flank was already resting on the Swamp, it was not easy for Lee’s army to prevent his passage.

But 28,000 Confederates were already south of the Chickahominy, on the flank of McClellan’s line of march, and it was certainly possible that this force might detain the Federals until A.P.  Hill, Longstreet, and Jackson should come up.  Magruder and Huger were therefore ordered to advance early on the 29th, and moving, the one by the Williamsburg, the other by the Charles City road, to strike the enemy in flank.