of “regiment after regiment rushing back in utter disorder;” of others which it was impossible to rally; and of troops retiring in confusion, who cried out to the reinforcements, “You need not go in; we are whipped, we can’t do anything!” It is only fair to say that the reinforcements replied, “Get out of our way, we will show you how to do it;"* (* Reports of Whiting, Trimble, Rodes, Bradley T. Johnson, O.R. volume 11 part 1.) but it is not to be disguised that the Confederates at one time came near defeat.  With another division in reserve at the critical moment, Porter might have maintained his line unbroken.  His troops, had they been supported, were still capable of resistance.

McClellan, however, up to the time the battle was lost, had sent but one division (Slocum’s) and two batteries to Porter’s support. 66,000 Federals, on the south bank of the Chickahominy, had been held in their intrenchments, throughout the day, by the demonstrations of 28,000 Confederates.  Intent on saving his trains, on securing his retreat to the river James, and utterly regardless of the chances which fortune offered, the “Young Napoleon” had allowed his rearguard to be overwhelmed.  He was not seen on the plateau which his devoted troops so well defended, nor even at the advanced posts on the further bank of the Chickahominy.  So convinced was he of the accuracy of the information furnished by his detective staff that he never dreamt of testing the enemy’s numbers by his own eyesight.  Had he watched the development of Lee’s attack, noted the small number of his batteries, the long delay in the advance of the supports, the narrow front of his line of battle, he would have discovered that the Confederate strength had been greatly exaggerated.  There were moments, too, during the fight when a strong counterstroke, made by fresh troops, would have placed Lee’s army in the greatest peril.  But a general who thinks only of holding his lines and not of annihilating the enemy is a poor tactician, and McClellan’s lack of enterprise, which Lee had so accurately gauged, may be inferred from his telegram to Lincoln:  “I have lost this battle because my force is too small."* (* Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War.)

Porter was perhaps a more than sufficient substitute for the Commander-in-Chief.  His tactics, as fighting a waiting battle, had been admirable; and, when his front was broken, strongly and with cool judgment he sought to hold back the enemy and cover the bridges.  The line of batteries he established across the plateau—­80 guns in all—­proved at first an effective barrier.  But the retreat of the infantry, the waning light, and the general dissolution of all order, had its effect upon the gunners.  When the remnant of the 5th Cavalry was borne back in flight, the greater part of the batteries had already limbered up, and over the bare surface of the upland the Confederate infantry, shooting down the terrified teams, rushed forward in hot pursuit. 22 guns, with a large number