Obeying orders very literally himself, Jackson found it difficult to believe that others did not do the same.  He knew that the position he had taken up rendered the line of Beaver Dam Creek untenable by the Federals.  They would never stand to fight on that line with a strong force established in their rear and menacing their communications, nor would they dare to deliver a counterstroke through the trackless woods.  It might confidently be assumed, therefore, that they would fall back during the night, and that the Confederate advance would then be carried out in that concentrated formation which Lee’s orders had dictated.  Such, in all probability, was Jackson’s view of the situation; and that Hill, in direct contravention of those orders, would venture on an isolated attack before that formation had been assumed never for a moment crossed his mind.* (* Longstreet, on page 124 of his From Manassas to Appomattox, declares that “Jackson marched by the fight without giving attention, and went into camp at Hundley’s Corner, half A mile in rear of the enemy’s position.”  A reference to the map is sufficient to expose the inaccuracy of this statement.)

Map of the environs of Richmond.

Hill, on the other hand, seems to have believed that if the Federals were not defeated on the evening of the 26th they would make use of the respite, either to bring up reinforcements, or to advance on Richmond by the opposite bank of the Chickahominy.  It is not impossible that he thought the sound of his cannon would bring Jackson to his aid.  That it would have been wiser to establish communication, and to make certain of that aid before attacking, there can be no question.  It was too late to defeat Porter the same evening.  Nothing was to be gained by immediate attack, and much would be risked.  The last assault, in which the heaviest losses were incurred, was made just as night fell.  It was a sacrifice of life as unnecessary as that of the Prussian Guard before St. Privat.  At the same time, that General Hill did wrong in crossing the Chickahominy before he heard of his colleague’s approach is not a fair accusation.  To have lingered on the south bank would have been to leave Jackson to the tender mercies of the Federals should they turn against him in the forest.  Moreover, it was Hill’s task to open a passage for the remaining divisions, and if that passage had been deferred to a later hour, it is improbable that the Confederate army would have been concentrated on the north bank of the Chickahominy until the next morning.  It must be admitted, too, that the situation in which Hill found himself, after crossing the river, was an exceedingly severe test of his self-control.  His troops had driven in the Federal outposts; infantry, cavalry, and artillery were retiring before his skirmishers.  The noise of battle filled the air.  From across the Chickahominy thundered the heavy guns, and his regiments were pressing