When Jackson reached Hundley’s Corner, and drove the Federal infantry behind the Creek, the first thing to do, as his orders indicated, was to get touch with the rest of the army.  It was already near sunset; between Hundley’s Corner and Mechanicsville lay a dense forest, with no roads in the desired direction; and it was manifestly impossible, under ordinary conditions, to do more that evening than to establish connection; the combined movement against the enemy’s position must be deferred till the morning.  But the sound of battle to the south-west introduced a complication.  “We distinctly heard,” says Jackson, “the rapid and continued discharges of cannon."* (* Jackson’s Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 553.) What did this fire portend?  It might proceed, as was to be inferred from Lee’s orders, from the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy covering Hill’s passage.  It might mean a Federal counterstroke on Hill’s advanced guard; or, possibly, a premature attack on the part of the Confederates.  General Whiting, according to his report, thought it “indicated a severe battle."* (* Whiting’s Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 562.) General Trimble, marching with Ewell, heard both musketry and artillery; and in his opinion the command should have moved forward;* (* Trimble’s Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 614.) and whatever may have been Jackson’s orders, it was undoubtedly his duty, if he believed a hot engagement was in progress, to have marched to the assistance of his colleagues.  He could not help them by standing still.  He might have rendered them invaluable aid by pressing the enemy in flank.  But the question is, What inference did the cannonade convey to Jackson’s mind?  Was it of such a character as to leave no doubt that Hill was in close action, or might it be interpreted as the natural accompaniment of the passage of the Chickahominy?  The evidence is conflicting.  On the one hand we have the evidence of Whiting and Trimble, both experienced soldiers; on the other, in addition to the indirect evidence of Jackson’s inaction, we have the statement of Major Dabney.  “We heard no signs,” says the chief of the staff, “of combat on Beaver Dam Creek until a little while before sunset.  The whole catastrophe took place in a few minutes about that time; and in any case our regiments, who had gone into bivouac, could not have been reassembled, formed up, and moved forward in time to be of any service.  A night attack through the dense, pathless, and unknown forest was quite impracticable."* (* Letter to the author.) It seems probable, then—­and the Federal reports are to the same effect* (* Porter’s Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 222.  Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 330.)—­that the firing was only really heavy for a very short period, and that Jackson believed it to be occasioned by Hill’s passage of the Chickahominy, and the rout of the Federals from Mechanicsville.  Neither Trimble nor Whiting were aware that Lee’s orders directed that the operation was to be covered by a heavy cannonade.