Beaver Dam Station.  He had not been furnished with a map, and not a single orderly or message reached him during the whole day.”) It may be remarked, too, that Generals Branch and Ewell, following converging roads, met near Shady Grove Church about 3 P.M.  No report appears to have been sent by the latter to General A.P.  Hill; and although Branch a little later received a message to the effect that Hill had crossed the Chickahominy and was moving on Mechanicsville,* (* Branch’s Report, O.R. volume 2 part 2 page 882.) the information was not passed on to Jackson.

Neglect of these precautions made it impracticable to arrange a simultaneous attack, and co-operation depended solely on the judgment of Hill and Jackson.  In the action which ensued on Beaver Dam Creek there was no co-operation whatever.  Hill attacked and was repulsed.  Jackson had halted at Hundley’s Corner, three miles distant from the battle-field.  Had the latter come down on the Federal rear while Hill moved against their front an easy success would in all probability have been the result.

Nevertheless, the responsibility for Hill’s defeat cannot be held to rest on Jackson’s shoulders.  On August 18, 1870, the Prussian Guards and the Saxon Army Corps were ordered to make a combined attack on the village of St. Privat, the Guards moving against the front, the Saxons against the flank.  When the order was issued the two corps were not more than two miles apart.  The tract of country which lay between them was perfectly open, the roads were free, and inter-communication seemed easy in the extreme.  Yet, despite their orders, despite the facilities of communication, the Guards advanced to the attack an hour and a half too soon; and from six o’clock to nearly seven their shattered lines lay in front of the position, at the mercy of a vigorous counterstroke, without a single Saxon regiment coming to their aid.  But the Saxons were not to blame.  Their march had been unchecked; they had moved at speed.  On their part there had been no hesitation; but on the part of the commander of the Guards there had been the same precipitation which led to the premature attack on the Federal position at Beaver Dam Creek.  It was the impatience of General Hill, not the tardiness of Jackson, which was the cause of the Confederate repulse.

We may now turn to the question whether Jackson was justified in not marching to the sound of the cannon.  Referring to General Lee’s orders, it will be seen that as soon as Longstreet and D.H.  Hill had crossed the Chickahominy the four divisions of the army were to move forward in communication with each other and drive the enemy from his position, Jackson, in advance upon the left, “turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the direction of Cold Harbour.”