The truth is, that the arrangements made by the Confederate headquarter staff were most inadequate.  In the first place, the order of the 24th, instructing Jackson to start from Slash Church at 3 A.M. on the 26th, and thus leading the other generals to believe that he would certainly be there at that hour, should never have been issued.  When it was written Jackson’s advanced guard was at Beaver Dam Station, the rear brigades fifteen miles behind; and to reach Slash Church his force had to march forty miles through an intricate country, in possession of the enemy, and so little known that it was impossible to designate the route to be followed.  To fix an hour of arrival so long in advance was worse than useless, and Jackson cannot be blamed if he failed to comply with the exact letter of a foolish order.  As it was, so many of the bridges were broken, and so difficult was it to pass the fords, that if Dr. Dabney had not found in his brother, a planter of the neighbourhood, an efficient substitute for the guide headquarters should have provided, the Valley army would have been not hours but days too late.  In the second place, the duty of keeping up communications should not have been left to Jackson, but have been seen to at headquarters.  Jackson had with him only a few cavalry, and these few had not only to supply the necessary orderlies for the subordinate generals, and the escorts for the artillery and trains, but to form his advanced guard, for Stuart’s squadrons were on his left flank, and not in his front.  Moreover, his cavalry were complete strangers to the country, and there were no maps.  In such circumstances the only means of ensuring constant communication was to have detached two of Stuart’s squadrons, who knew the ground, to establish a series of posts between Jackson’s line of march and the Chickahominy; and to have detailed a staff officer, whose sole duty would have been to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with hourly reports of the progress made, to join the Valley army.* (* Of the events of June 26 Dr. Dabney, in a letter to the author, writes as follows:—­“Here we had a disastrous illustration of the lack of an organised and intelligent general staff.  Let my predicament serve as a specimen.  As chief of Jackson’s staff, I had two assistant adjutant-generals, two men of the engineer department, and two clerks.  What did I have for orderlies and couriers?  A detail from some cavalry company which happened to bivouac near.  The men were sent to me without any reference to their local knowledge, their intelligence, or their courage; most probably they were selected for me by their captain on account of their lack of these qualities.  Next to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the General Staff should be the best man in the country.  The brains of an army should be in the General Staff.  The lowest orderlies attached to it should be the very best soldiers in the service, for education, intelligence, and courage.  Jackson had to find his own guide for his march from