3 P.M.

At 3 P.M., hearing nothing from his colleagues, and apprehensive that longer delay might hazard the failure of the whole plan, he ordered his advanced guard to seize the bridge.  The enemy, already threatened in rear by Branch, at once fell back.  Hill followed the retiring pickets towards Beaver Dam Creek, and after a short march of three miles found himself under fire of the Federal artillery.  Porter had occupied a position about two miles above New Bridge.

The rest of the Confederate army was already crossing the Chickahominy; and although there was no sign of Jackson, and the enemy’s front was strong, protected by a long line of batteries, Hill thought it necessary to order an attack.  A message from Lee, ordering him to postpone all further movement, arrived too late.* (* Letter from Captain T.W.  Sydnor, 4th Virginia Cavalry, who carried the message.) There was no artillery preparation, and the troops, checked unexpectedly by a wide abattis, were repulsed with terrible slaughter, the casualties amounting to nearly 2000 men.* (* So General Porter.  Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 331.) The Union loss was 360.* (* O.R. volume 11 part 1 pages 38, 39.)

4.30 P.M.

Jackson, about 4.30 P.M., before this engagement had begun, had reached Hundley’s Corner, three miles north of the Federal position, but separated from it by dense forest and the windings of the creek.  On the opposite bank was a detachment of Federal infantry, supported by artillery.

6 P.M.

Two guns, accompanied by the advanced guard, sufficed to drive this force to the shelter of the woods; and then, establishing his outposts, Jackson ordered his troops to bivouac.

It has been asserted by more than one Southern general that the disaster at Beaver Dam Creek was due to Jackson’s indifferent tactics; and, at first sight, the bare facts would seem to justify the verdict.  He had not reached his appointed station on the night of the 25th, and on the 26th he was five hours behind time.  He should have crossed the Virginia Central Railway at sunrise, but at nine o’clock he was still three miles distant.  His advance against the Federal right flank and rear should have been made in co-operation with the remainder of the army.  But his whereabouts was unknown when Hill attacked; and although the cannonade was distinctly heard at Hundley’s Corner, he made no effort to lend assistance, and his troops were encamping when their comrades, not three miles away, were rushing forward to the assault.  There would seem to be some grounds, then, for the accusation that his delay thwarted General Lee’s design; some reason for the belief that the victor of the Valley campaign, on his first appearance in combination with the main army, had proved a failure, and that his failure was in those very qualities of swiftness and energy to which he owed his fame.

General D.H.  Hill has written that “Jackson’s genius never shone when he was under the command of another.  It seemed then to be shrouded or paralysed...MacGregor on his native heath was not more different from MacGregor in prison than was Jackson his own master from Jackson in a subordinate position.  This was the keynote to his whole character.  The hooded falcon cannot strike the quarry."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 pages 389, 390.)