On the 25th Longstreet and the two Hills moved towards the bridges; and although during the movement McClellan drove back Magruder’s pickets to their trenches, and pushed his own outposts nearer Richmond, Lee held firmly to his purpose.  As a matter of fact, there was little to be feared from McClellan.  With a profound belief in the advantages of defensive and in the strength of a fortified position, he expected nothing less than that the Confederates would leave the earthworks they had so laboriously constructed, and deliberately risk the perils of an attack.  He seems to have had little idea that in the hands of a skilful general intrenchments may form a “pivot of operations,"* (* The meaning of this term is clearly defined in Lee’s report.  “It was therefore determined to construct defensive lines, so as to enable a part of the army to defend the city, and leave the other part free to operate on the north bank.”  O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 490.) the means whereby he covers his most vulnerable point, holds the enemy in front, and sets his main body free for offensive action.  Yet McClellan was by no means easy in his mind.  He knew Jackson was approaching.  He knew his communications were threatened.  Fugitive negroes, who, as usual, either exaggerated or lied, had informed him that the Confederates had been largely reinforced, and that Beauregard, with a portion of the Western army, had arrived in Richmond.  But that his right wing was in danger he had not the faintest suspicion.  He judged Lee by himself.  Such a plan as leaving a small force to defend Richmond, and transferring the bulk of the army to join Jackson, he would have at once rejected as over-daring.  If attack came at all, he expected that it would come by the south bank; and he was so far from anticipating that an opportunity for offensive action might be offered to himself that, on the night of the 25th, he sent word to his corps commanders that they were to regard their intrenchments as “the true field of battle."* (* O.R. volume 11 part 3 page 252.)

June 26. 3 A.M.

Lee’s orders left much to Jackson.  The whole operation which Lee had planned hinged upon his movements.  On the morning of the 24th he was at Beaver Dam Station.  The same night he was to reach Ashland, eighteen miles distant as the crow flies.  On the night of the 25th he was to halt near the Slash Church, just west of the Virginia Central Railway, and six miles east of Ashland.  At three o’clock, however, on the morning of the 26th, the Army of the Valley was still at Ashland, and it was not till nine that it crossed the railroad.

10.30 A.M.

Branch, on hearing that Jackson was at last advancing, passed the Chickahominy by Winston’s Bridge, and driving Federal pickets before him, moved on Mechanicsville.  General A.P.  Hill was meanwhile near Meadow Bridge, waiting until the advance of Jackson and Branch should turn the flank of the Federal force which blocked his passage.