their construction, or to discover their weak points.  His urgent demands for reinforcements had appeared in the Northern newspapers, and those newspapers had found their way to Richmond.  From the same source the Confederates were made aware that he believed himself confronted by an army far larger than his own; and when, on the departure of Whiting’s division for the Valley, he refused to take advantage of the opportunity to attack Lee’s diminished force, it became abundantly clear, if further proof were wanting, that much might be ventured against so timid a commander.

From his knowledge of his adversary’s character, and still more from his attitude, Lee had little difficulty in discovering his intentions.  McClellan, on the other hand, failed to draw a single correct inference.  And yet the information at his disposal was sufficient to enable him to form a fair estimate of how things stood in the Confederate camp.  He had been attacked at Seven Pines, but not by superior numbers; and it was hardly likely that the enemy had not employed their whole available strength in this battle; otherwise their enterprise was insensate.  Furthermore, it was clearly to the interests of the Confederates to strike at his army before McDowell could join him.  They had not done so, and it was therefore probable that they did not feel themselves strong enough to do so.  It is true that he was altogether misled by the intelligence supplied as to the garrison of Richmond by his famous detective staff. 200,000 was the smallest number which the chief agent would admit.  But that McClellan should have relied on the estimate of these untrained observers rather than on the evidence furnished by the conduct of the enemy is but a further proof that he lacked all power of deduction.* (* In one sense McClellan was not far wrong in his estimate of the Confederate numbers.  In assuming control of the Union armies Lincoln and Stanton made their enemies a present of at least 50,000 men.)

It may well be questioned whether he was anxious at heart to measure swords with Lee.  His knowledge of his adversary, whose reputation for daring, for ability, for strength of purpose, had been higher than any other in the old army, must needs have had a disturbing influence on his judgment.  Against an enemy he did not know McClellan might have acted with resolution.  Face to face with Lee, it can hardly be doubted that the weaker will was dominated by the stronger.  Vastly different were their methods of war.  McClellan made no effort whatever either to supplement or to corroborate the information supplied by his detectives.  Since he had reached West Point his cavalry had done little.* (* It must be admitted that his cavalry was very weak in proportion to the other arms.  On June 20 he had just over 5000 sabres (O.R. volume 11 part 3 page 238), of which 3,000 were distributed among the army corps.  The Confederates appear to have had about 3,000, but of superior quality,