The staff of a regular army is not always infallible.  It would be hard to match the extraordinary series of blunders made by the staffs of the three armies—­English, French, and Prussian—­in the campaign of Waterloo, and yet there was probably no senior officer present in Belgium who had not seen several campaigns.  But the art of war has made vast strides since Waterloo, and even since 1870.  Under Moltke’s system, which has been applied in a greater or less degree to nearly all professional armies, the chance of mistakes has been much reduced.  The staff is no longer casually educated and selected haphazard; the peace training of both officers and men is far more thorough; and those essential details on which the most brilliant conceptions, tactical and strategical, depend for success stand much less chance of being overlooked than in 1815.  It is by the standard of a modern army, and not of those whose only school in peace was the parade-ground, that the American armies must be judged.

That Jackson’s tactical skill, and his quick eye for ground, had much to do with his victories can hardly be questioned.  At Kernstown and Port Republic he seized the key of the position without a moment’s hesitation.  At Winchester, when Ewell was checked upon the right, three strong brigades, suddenly thrown forward on the opposite flank, completely rolled up the Federal line.  At Cross Keys the position selected for Ewell proved too formidable for Fremont, despite his superiority in guns.  At Port Republic, Taylor’s unexpected approach through the tangled forest was at once decisive of the engagement.  The cavalry charge at Front Royal was admirably timed; and the manner in which Ashby was employed throughout the campaign, not only to screen the advance but to check pursuit, was a proof of the highest tactical ability.  Nor should the quick insight into the direction of Shields’ march on June 1, and the destruction of the bridges by which he could communicate with Fremont, be omitted.  It is true that the operations in the Valley were not absolutely faultless.  When Jackson was bent on an effective blow his impatience to bring the enemy to bay robbed him more than once of complete success.  On the march to M’Dowell Johnson’s brigade, the advanced guard, had been permitted to precede the main body by seven miles, and, consequently, when Milroy attacked there was not sufficient force at hand for a decisive counterstroke.  Moreover, with an ill-trained staff a careful supervision was most essential, and the waggon bridge at Port Republic should have been inspected by a trustworthy staff officer before Winder rushed across to fall on Tyler.