testimony to his ability.  “How often,” says Napier, “have we not heard the genius of Buonaparte slighted, and his victories talked of as destitute of merit, because, at the point of attack, he was superior in numbers to his enemies!  This very fact, which has been so often converted into a sort of reproach, constitutes his greatest and truest praise.  He so directed his attack as at once to divide his enemy, and to fall with the mass of his own forces upon a point where their division, or the distribution of their army, left them unable to resist him.  It is not in man to defeat armies by the breath of his mouth; nor was Buonaparte commissioned, like Gideon, to confound and destroy a host with three hundred men.  He knew that everything depended ultimately upon physical superiority; and his genius was shown in this, that, though outnumbered on the whole, he was always superior to his enemies at the decisive point."*

(* The following table, of which the idea is borrowed from The Principles of Strategy, by Captain Bigelow, U.S.A., may be found interesting.  Under the heading “Strategic” appear the numbers available on the theatre of operations; under the heading “Tactical” the numbers present on the field of battle.  See also note at the end of the volume.

                         Strategic tactical
                        M’Dowell
Federal 30,000 2,500
Confederate 17,000 6,000
                        Winchester
Federal 60,000 7,500
Confederate 16,000 16,000
                        Cross Keys
Federal 23,000 12,750
Confederate 13,000 8,000
                        Port Republic
Federal 22,000 4,500
Confederate 12,700 6,000

The material results of the Valley campaign were by no means inconsiderable. 8500 prisoners were either paroled or sent to Richmond. 3500 Federals were killed or wounded.  An immense quantity of stores was captured, and probably as much destroyed. 9 guns were taken and over 10,000 rifles, while the loss of the Confederates was no more than 2500 killed and wounded, 600 prisoners, and 3 guns.  It may be added that the constant surprises, together with the successive conflict with superior numbers, had the worst effect on the morale of the Federal soldiers.  The troops commanded by Fremont, Shields, Banks, Saxton, and Geary were all infected.  Officers resigned and men deserted.  On the least alarm there was a decided tendency to “stampede.”  The generals thought only of retreat.  Fremont, after Cross Keys, did not think that his men would stand, and many of his men declared that it was “only murder” to fight without reinforcements.* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 402.)