It is when regarded in connection with the operations of the main armies that the Valley campaign stands out in its true colours; but, at the same time, even as an isolated incident, it is in the highest degree interesting.  It has been compared, and not inaptly, with the Italian campaign of 1796.  And it may even be questioned whether, in some respects, it was not more brilliant.  The odds against the Confederates were far greater than against the French.  Jackson had to deal with a homogeneous enemy, with generals anxious to render each other loyal support, and not with the contingents of different States.  His marches were far longer than Napoleon’s.  The theatre of war was not less difficult.  His troops were not veterans, but, in great part, the very rawest of recruits.  The enemy’s officers and soldiers were not inferior to his own; their leaders were at least equal in capacity to Colli, Beaulieu, and Alvinzi, and the statesmen who directed them were not more purblind than the Aulic Council.  Moreover, Jackson was merely the commander of a detached force, which might at any moment be required at Richmond.  The risks which Napoleon freely accepted he could not afford.  He dared not deliver battle unless he were certain of success, and his one preoccupation was to lose as few men as possible.  But be this as it may, in the secrecy of the Confederate movements, the rapidity of the marches, and the skilful use of topographical features, the Valley campaign bears strong traces of the Napoleonic methods.  Seldom has the value of these methods been more forcibly illustrated.  Three times was McDowell to have marched to join McClellan:  first, at the beginning of April, when he was held back by Kernstown; second, on May 26, when he was held back by Front Royal and Winchester; third, on June 25, when he was held back by Jackson’s disappearance after Port Republic.  Above all, the campaign reveals a most perfect appreciation of the surest means of dealing with superior numbers.  “In my personal intercourse with Jackson,” writes General Imboden, “in the early part of the war, he often said that there were two things never to be lost sight of by a military commander.  “Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never give up the pursuit as long as your men have strength to follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can then be destroyed by half their number.  The other rule is, never fight against heavy odds, if by any possible manoeuvering you can hurl your own force on only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy and crush it.  Such tactics will win every time, and a small army may thus destroy a large one in detail, and repeated victory will make it invincible."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 297.) And again:  “To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the fruits of victory, is the secret of successful war."”