It is, perhaps, true that Johnston and Lee had a larger share in Jackson’s success than has been generally recognised.  It was due to Johnston that Jackson was retained in the Valley when McClellan moved to the Peninsula; and his, too, was the fundamental idea of the campaign, that the Federals in the Valley were to be prevented from reinforcing the army which threatened Richmond.  To Lee belongs still further credit.  From the moment he assumed command we find the Confederate operations directed on a definite and well-considered plan; a defensive attitude round Richmond, a vigorous offensive in the Valley, leading to the dispersion of the enemy, and a Confederate concentration on the Chickahominy.  His operations were very bold.  When McClellan, with far superior numbers, was already within twenty miles of Richmond, he had permitted Jackson to retain Ewell’s 8000 in the Valley, and he would have given him the brigades of Branch and Mahone.  From Lee, too, came the suggestion that a blow should be struck at Banks, that he should be driven back to the Potomac, and that the North should be threatened with invasion.  From him, too, at a moment when McClellan’s breastworks could be actually seen from Richmond, came the 7000 men under Whiting and Lawton, the news of whose arrival in the Valley had spread such consternation amongst the Federals.  But it is to be remembered that Jackson viewed the situation in exactly the same light as his superiors.  The instructions he received were exactly the instructions he would have given had he been in command at Richmond; and it may be questioned whether even he would have carried them out with such whole-hearted vigour if he had not thoroughly agreed with every detail.

Lee’s strategy was indeed remarkable.  He knew McClellan and he knew Lincoln.  He knew that the former was over-cautious; he knew that the latter was over-anxious.  No sudden assault on the Richmond lines, weak as they were, was to be apprehended, and a threat against Washington was certain to have great results.  Hence the audacity which, at a moment apparently most critical, sent 17,000 of the best troops in the Confederacy as far northward as Harper’s Ferry, and, a fortnight later, weakened the garrison of Richmond by 7000 infantry.  He was surely a great leader who, in the face of an overwhelming enemy, dared assume so vast a responsibility.  But it is to be remembered that Lee made no suggestion whatever as to the manner in which his ideas were to be worked out.  Everything was left to Jackson.  The swift manoeuvres which surprised in succession his various enemies emanated from himself alone.  It was his brain that conceived the march by Mechum’s Station to M’Dowell, the march that surprised Fremont and bewildered Banks.  It was his brain that conceived the rapid transfer of the Valley army from the one side of the Massanuttons to the other, the march that surprised Kenly and drove Banks in panic to the Potomac.  It was his brain that conceived