So much for the leading of civilians.  On the other hand, the failure of the Federals to concentrate more than 105,000 men at the decisive point, and even to establish those 105,000 in a favourable position, was mainly due to the superior strategy of the Confederates.  Those were indeed skilful manoeuvres which prevented McDowell from marching to the Chickahominy; and, at the critical moment, when Lee was on the point of attacking McClellan, which drew McDowell, Banks, and Fremont on a wild-goose chase towards Charlottesville.  The weak joint in the enemy’s armour, the national anxiety for Washington, was early recognised.  Kernstown induced Lincoln, departing from the original scheme of operations, to form four independent armies, each acting on a different line.  Two months later, when McClellan was near Richmond it was of essential importance that the move of these armies should be combined, Jackson once more intervened; Banks was driven across the Potomac, and again the Federal concentration was postponed.  Lastly, the battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic, followed by the dispatch of Whiting and Lawton to the Valley, led the Northern President to commit his worst mistake.  For the second time the plan of campaign was changed, and McClellan was left isolated at the moment he most needed help.

The brains of two great leaders had done more for the Confederacy than 200,000 soldiers had done for the Union.  Without quitting his desk, and leaving the execution of his plans to Jackson, Lee had relieved Richmond of the pressure of 70,000 Federals, and had lured the remainder into the position he most wished to find them.  The Confederacy, notwithstanding the enormous disparity of force, had once more gained the upper hand; and from this instance, as from a score of others, it may be deduced that Providence is more inclined to side with the big brains than with the big battalions.

It was not mere natural ability that had triumphed.  Lee, in this respect, was assuredly not more highly gifted than Lincoln, or Jackson than McClellan.  But, whether by accident or design, Davis had selected for command of the Confederate army, and had retained in the Valley, two past masters in the art of strategy.  If it was accident he was singularly favoured by fortune.  He might have selected many soldiers of high rank and long service, who would have been as innocent of strategical skill as Lincoln himself.  His choice might have fallen on the most dashing leader, the strictest disciplinarian, the best drill, in the Confederate army; and yet the man who united all these qualities might have been altogether ignorant of the higher art of war.  Mr. Davis himself had been a soldier.  He was a graduate of West Point, and in the Mexican campaign he had commanded a volunteer regiment with much distinction.  But as a director of military operations he was a greater marplot than even Stanton.  It by no means follows that because a man has lived his life in camp and barrack, has long experience