CHAPTER 1.12.  REVIEW OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN.

In March, 1862, more than 200,000 Federals were prepared to invade Virginia.  McClellan, before McDowell was withheld, reckoned on placing 150,000 men at West Point.  Fremont, in West Virginia, commanded 30,000, including the force in the Kanawha Valley; and Banks had crossed the Potomac with over 30,000.

Less than 60,000 Confederate soldiers were available to oppose this enormous host, and the numerical disproportion was increased by the vast material resources of the North.  The only advantages which the Southerners possessed were that they were operating in their own country, and that their cavalry was the more efficient.  Their leaders, therefore, could count on receiving more ample and more accurate information than their adversaries.* (* “If I were mindful only of my own glory, I would choose always to make war in my own country, for there every man is a spy, and the enemy can make no movement of which I am not informed.”  Frederick the Great’s Instructions to his Generals.) But, except in these respects, everything was against them.  In mettle and in discipline the troops were fairly matched.  On both sides the higher commands, with few exceptions, were held by regular officers, who had received the same training.  On both sides the staff was inexperienced.  If the Confederate infantry were better marksmen than the majority of the Federals, they were not so well armed; and the Federal artillery, both in materiel and in handling, was the more efficient.

The odds against the South were great; and to those who believed that Providence sides with the big battalions, that numbers, armament, discipline, and tactical efficiency, are all that is required to ensure success, the fall of Richmond must have seemed inevitable.

But within three months of the day that McClellan started for the Peninsula the odds had been much reduced.  The Confederates had won no startling victories.  Except in the Valley, and there only small detachments were concerned, the fighting had been indecisive.  The North had no reason to believe that her soldiers, save only the cavalry, were in any way inferior to their adversaries.  And yet, on June 26, where were the “big battalions?” 105,000 men were intrenched within sight of the spires of Richmond; but where were the rest?  Where were the 70,000* (* At the date of the action at Front Royal, May 23, the following was the strength of the detached forces:  Banks, 10,000; Fremont, 25,000; McDowell (including Shields, but excluding McCall), 35,000.) that should have aided McClellan, have encircled the rebel capital on every side, cut the communications, closed the sources of supply, and have overwhelmed the starving garrison?  How came it that Fremont and Banks were no further south than they were in March? that the Shenandoah Valley still poured its produce into Richmond? that McDowell had not yet crossed the Rappahannock?  What mysterious power had compelled Lincoln to retain a force larger than the whole Confederate army “to protect the national capital from danger and insult?”