or more.”  On the 20th Jackson was said to be moving on Warrenton, east of the Blue Ridge.  On the 22nd “reliable persons” at Harper’s Ferry had learned that he was about to attack Banks at Middletown; and on the same day Ewell, who was actually near Frederickshall, was discovered to be moving on Moorefield!  On the 25th Fremont had been informed that large reinforcements had reached Jackson from Tennessee; and Banks was on the watch for a movement from the west.  Fremont heard that Ewell designed to attack Winchester in rear, and the threat from so dangerous a quarter made Lincoln anxious.

“We have no definite information,” wrote Stanton to McClellan, “as to the numbers or position of Jackson’s force.  Within the last two days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumours of Jackson’s advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack.  Neither McDowell nor Banks nor Fremont appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject.”

This was on June 25, the day the Valley army halted at Ashland; but the climax was reached on the 28th.  For forty-eight hours Jackson had been fighting McClellan, yet Banks, although “quite confident that he was not within thirty miles, believed that he was preparing for an attack on Middletown.”  To reach Middletown Jackson would have had to march one hundred and fifty miles!

Under the influence of these rumours the movements of the Federal troops were erratic in the extreme.

Fremont, who had originally been ordered to remain at Harrisonburg, had fallen back on Banks at Middletown, although ordered to Front Royal, was most reluctant to move so far south.  Shields was first ordered to stand fast at Luray, where he would be reinforced by Ricketts, and was then ordered to fall back on Front Royal.  Reinforcements were ordered to Romney, to Harper’s Ferry, and to Winchester; and McDowell, who kept his head throughout, struggled in vain to reunite his scattered divisions.  Divining the true drift of the Confederate strategy, he realised that to protect Washington, and to rescue McClellan, the surest method was for his own army corps to march as rapidly as possible to the Chickahominy.  But his pleadings were disregarded.  Lincoln and Stanton had not yet discovered that the best defence is generally a vigorous attack.  They had learned nothing from the Valley campaign, and they were infected with the fears of Banks and Fremont.  Jackson was well on his way to Richmond before Shields and Ricketts were permitted to cross the Blue Ridge; and it was not till the 25th that McDowell’s corps was once more concentrated at Fredericksburg.  The Confederates had gained a start of five marches, and the Northern Government was still ignorant that they had left the Valley.

McClellan was equally in the dark.  Faint rumours had preceded the march of Jackson’s army, but he had given them scant credit.  On the morning of the 26th, however, he was rudely enlightened.  It was but too clear that Jackson, strongly reinforced from Richmond, was bearing down upon his most vulnerable point—­his right wing, which, in anticipation of McDowell’s advance, remained exposed on the north bank of the Chickahominy.