June 17.

On June 17 arrived a last letter from Lee:—­

“From your account of the position of the enemy I think it would be difficult for you to engage him in time to unite with this army in the battle for Richmond.  Fremont and Shields are apparently retrograding, their troops shaken and disorganised, and some time will be required to set them again in the field.  If this is so, the sooner you unite with this army the better.  McClellan is being strengthened...There is much sickness in his ranks, but his reinforcements by far exceed his losses.  The present, therefore, seems to be favourable for a junction of your army and this.  If you agree with me, the sooner you can make arrangements to do so the better.  In moving your troops you could let it be understood that it was to pursue the enemy in your front.  Dispose those to hold the Valley, so as to deceive the enemy, keeping your cavalry well in their front, and at the proper time suddenly descending upon the Pamunkey.  To be efficacious the movement must be secret.  Let me know the force you can bring, and be careful to guard from friends and foes your purpose and your intention of personally leaving the Valley.  The country is full of spies, and our plans are immediately carried to the enemy."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 913.)

The greater part of these instructions Jackson had already carried out on his own initiative.  There remained but to give final directions to Colonel Munford, who was to hold the Valley, and to set the army in motion.  Munford was instructed to do his best to spread false reports of an advance to the Potomac.  Ewell’s division was ordered to Charlottesville.  The rest of the Valley troops were to follow Ewell; and Whiting and Lawton, who, in order to bewilder Fremont, had been marched from Staunton to Mount Meridian, and then back to Staunton, were to take train to Gordonsville.  It was above all things important that the march should be secret.  Not only was it essential that Lincoln should not be alarmed into reinforcing McClellan, but it was of even more importance that McClellan should not be alarmed into correcting the faulty distribution of his army.  So long as he remained with half his force on one bank of the Chickahominy and half on the other, Lee had a fair chance of concentrating superior numbers against one of the fractions.  But if McClellan, warned of Jackson’s approach, were to mass his whole force on one bank or the other, there would be little hope of success for the Confederates.

The ultimate object of the movement was therefore revealed to no one, and the most rigorous precautions were adopted to conceal it.  Jackson’s letters from Richmond, in accordance with his own instructions, bore no more explicit address than “Somewhere.”  A long line of cavalry, occupying every road, covered the front, and prevented anyone, soldier or civilian, preceding them toward Richmond.  Far out to either flank rode patrols of horsemen, and a strong rear-guard