Before the reinforcements reached the Valley both Fremont and Shields were out of reach.  To have followed them down the Valley would have been injudicious.  Another victory would have doubtless held M’Dowell fast, but it would have drawn Jackson too far from Richmond.  The Confederate generals, therefore, in order to impose upon their enemies, and to maintain the belief that Washington was threatened, had recourse to stratagem.  The departure of Whiting and Lawton for the Valley was ostentatiously announced.  Federal prisoners, about to be dismissed upon parole, were allowed to see the trains full of soldiers proceeding westward, to count the regiments.  And learn their destination.  Thus Lee played his part in the game of deception, and meanwhile Jackson had taken active measures to the same end.

Fremont had retired from Port Republic on the morning of the 10th.  On the 11th the Confederate cavalry, now under Colonel Munford, a worthy successor of the indefatigable Ashby, crossed the Shenandoah, and followed the retreating enemy.  So active was the pursuit that Fremont evacuated Harrisonburg, abandoning two hundred wounded in the hospitals, besides medical and other stores.

June 14.

“Significant demonstrations of the enemy,” to use his own words, drove him next day from the strong position at Mount Jackson; and on June 14 he fell back to Strasburg, Banks, who had advanced to Middletown, being in close support.

On the 12th the Army of the Valley had once more moved westward, and, crossing South River, had encamped in the woods near Mount Meridian.  Here for five days, by the sparkling waters of the Shenandoah, the wearied soldiers rested, while their indefatigable leader employed ruse after ruse to delude the enemy.  The cavalry, though far from support, was ordered to manoeuvre boldly to prevent all information reaching the Federals, and to follow Fremont so long as he retreated.* (* “The only true rule for cavalry is to follow as long as the enemy retreats.”—­Jackson to Munford, June 13.) The bearers of flags of truce were impressed with the idea that the Southerners were advancing in great strength.  The outpost line was made as close as possible; no civilians were allowed to pass; and the troopers, so that they should have nothing to tell it they were captured, were kept in ignorance of the position of their own infantry.  The general’s real intentions were concealed from everyone except Colonel Munford.  The officers of the staff fared worse than the remainder of the army.  Not only were they debarred from their commander’s confidence, but they became the unconscious instruments whereby false intelligence was spread.  “The engineers were directed to prepare a series of maps of the Valley; and all who acquired a knowledge of this carefully divulged order told their friends in confidence that Jackson was going at once in pursuit of Fremont.  As those friends told their friends without loss of time, it was soon the well-settled conviction of everybody that nothing was further from Jackson’s intention than an evacuation of the Valley.”